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BRANDT, MELDA MARY. Effect of Explicitness of Task Presentation and 
Response Format on Cognitive Role-Taking in Children Ages Four, Six, 
and Eight Years. (1976) 
Directed by: Dr. Garrett W. Lange. Pp. 168. 
The purpose of the present study was to assess the relation between 
cognitive role-taking ability and three independent variables: 1) age, 
2) the explicitness with which the cognitive perspectives were differ­
entiated in the presentation of the task, and 3) the type of response 
required of the child. A picture task and a story task were presented 
individually to a total of 120 children in nursery school, first grade, 
and third grade. Both tasks required the child to interpret a situation 
from the point of view of another person who had less information about 
the situation than the child himself had. The picture task required 
the child to interpret a small portion of each picture (the "droodle") 
from the point of view of a classmate who had not seen the complete 
picture. The story task required the child to interpret the final scene 
of the story from the point of view of one of the characters, who had 
not seen everything that happened. 
Half the children in each age group received a task presentation 
procedure which emphasized the difference between the child's privi­
leged perspective (referred to as a "secret") and the perspective of 
the other person. The remaining children received a task presentation 
procedure which made no "xplicit reference to the difference in per­
spectives. For each item on each task, the child was asked three 
questions, all of which required him to take the role of the other, but 
which differed in the hypothesized difficulty of the responses required. 
The Level 3 question asked the child to predict the response of the 
other ("What will he think?"), and was hypothesized to be the most 
difficult. The Level 2 question asked the child to select one of two 
alternate responses, an egocentric or a non-egocentric response. The 
Level 1 question, hypothesized to be the easiest, directly asked the 
child whether or not the "other" knew the privileged information. 
The results indicated a significant relation between age and role-
taking performance. This relation held for both the picture and story 
tasks, and for all three levels of response. Greater improvement in 
performance was found between ages four and six than between ages six 
and eight. No relation was found between explicitness of task presen­
tation and role-taking performance. Emphasizing the difference between 
the cognitive perspectives did not facilitate role-taking for any level 
of response on either task. A significant relation was found between 
role-taking performance and level of response. The Level 1 questions 
elicited the highest number of non-egocentric, responses on both tasks. 
For Task A, the Level 3 questions were more difficult than the Level 2 
questions, as expected. For Task B, however, the Level 2 questions 
were more difficult than the Level 3 questions. Scores on Task A and 
Task B were found to be correlated for the total sample, but not within 
age groups. There were no systematic differences in difficulty between 
Task A and Task B. There was, however, more internal consistency among 
the items on Task A than among the items on Task B. 
It was concluded that cognitive role-taking performance, as mea­
sured by the two tasks used, is related to age and to the type of re­
sponse required of the child. However, these relations were not direct­
ly parallel for the two tasks. It was therefore concluded that there 
should be more study of role-taking performance in relation to the 
specific cognitive requirements of the role-taking tasks used. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
There has been considerable controversy recently about the age at 
which children can take the perspective of another; i.e., can under­
stand what another person sees, knows, or feels, when that knowledge, 
feeling, or percept is different from the child's own. Although there 
have heen a number of studies directed to this question, results have 
been inconsistent, and authors have drawn very different conclusions 
about the ability of young children to understand a point of view other 
than their own. There appears to have been little attempt to reconcile 
these diverse findings or to integrate them within a cognitive develop­
mental framework. The purpose of the present study was to examine one 
aspect of perspective-taking ability, about which different conclusions 
have been drawn. The study focused on cognitive perspective-taking, 
or the ability of the child to differentiate what another person knows 
from what he himself knows. Three perspective-taking tasks, which have 
produced conflicting results, were examined. An attempt to reconcile 
the discrepant results were made by 1) analyzing the cognitive 
requirements of successful performance on each task; 2) replicating two 
of the tasks on children in the developmental range originally used; 
and 3) introducing variations in task presentation and response format, 
which were predicted, on the basis of cognitive developmental theory, 
to alter performance. 
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The proposition that children younger than seven or eight years are 
unable to take the perspective of another person was originally presented 
by Piaget (1926, 1928). Piaget used the term "egocentrism" to refer to 
the tendency of the young child to view the world only from his own point 
of view. He defined egocentrism specifically as a lack of ability and a 
lack of desire or felt need to take into account the viewpoints of others; 
i.e., an inability to "decenter" from one's own point of view. Piaget 
supported this definition with evidence from several experiments which 
showed that children under six or seven years were unable to communicate 
with a listener in a way that took into account the listener's need for 
information (Piaget, 1926). In later studies, he showed that children 
under eight years were unable to reconstruct the aspect of a three-
dimensional visual display seen by a person sitting on the opposite side 
of the display (Piaget & Inhelder, 1956). Piaget considered egocentrism 
to be an inherent aspect of the preoperational stage of his sequence of 
cognitive development (Piaget, 1928, p. 201). Other characteristics of 
this cognitive stage include irreversibility of thought, unselfconscious­
ness and incommunicability of thought, non-analytic thinking, and the 
centration of attention on one salient aspect of a situation, to the 
neglect of other important aspects. Piaget observed a rapid decline in 
egocentrism at about seven or eight years, which he interpreted as an 
indication of, and the result of, the qualitative shift from the pre­
operational to the concrete operational stage of cognitive development. 
The increased ability of the concrete operational child to decenter was 
also accompanied by increased ability to reverse thought processes, to 
understand the logic of classes and relations, and to attend to and 
integrate multiple aspects of a situation. . 
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More recent theoretical statements have suggested that acquisition 
of the ability to decenter is a long-term developmental process. Fol­
lowing Piaget, Elkind (1967) and Looft (1972) have defined egocentrism 
as an embeddedness in one's own point of view. This embeddedness, or 
inability to decenter, prevents one from understanding the perspectives 
of others precisely because he is not aware that different people have 
different points of view. While Piaget emphasized the sharp increase 
in ability to decenter, which occurred at about seven to eight years, 
Elkind and Looft have suggested that the ability to decenter, or to 
understand another point of view, develops in stages over the entire 
course of childhood and adolescence. Although both Elkind and Looft 
refer to a series of advances in the ability to decenter, the behavioral 
changes predicted to accompany each advance have not been specified. 
Although Piaget used several different tasks to measure the child's 
ability to take the point of view of another, he spoke of egocentrism as 
a unitary trait. That is, the child who was egocentric was thought to 
be unable to comprehend the visual, cognitive, or affective perspective 
of another, if that perspective was different from his own. Looft 
(1972) and Elkind (1967) also referred to the ability to decenter as if 
it reflected a single cognitive dimension; and Flavell and his associ­
ates used the single term "role-taking" to refer to successful perfor­
mance on a variety of tasks requiring the child to take the visual or 
cognitive perspective of another (Flavell, Botkin, Fry, Wright, & 
Jarvis, 1968), There is, in fact, some evidence that different types of 
role-taking tasks do reflect a common underlying dimension. In a factor 
analytic study of several tasks previously used to assess visual and 
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cognitive perspective-taking, Rubin (1973) found a decentration factor, 
which accounted for a large proportion of the variance of the scores. 
Despite the evidence for a unitary role-taking or decentration factor, 
Ambron and Irwin (1974) have suggested that role-taking should be viewed 
as a summary variable or multidimensional construct. Although the 
various aspects of a summary variable may be related, they should not 
be treated as identical. Current studies of role-taking are more fre­
quently making the explicit distinction among perceptual role-taking 
(the ability to understand what another sees), cognitive role-taking 
(the ability to understand what another knows), and affective role-
taking (the ability to understand what another feels) (Ambron & Irwin, 
1974; Marvin, Mossier, & Greenberg, 1975; Yarrow & Waxier, 1975). The 
present study focused only on the cognitive role-taking dimension. 
Recent research on role-taking ability has generally taken one of 
two approaches. One approach has been to use tasks similar to those 
devised by Piaget in an attempt to substantiate his findings and support 
his contention that children younger than seven or eight cannot take the 
perspective of another. The other approach has been to use other types 
of tasks in an attempt to demonstrate that children younger than seven 
or eight have much more perspective-taking ability than has been pre­
viously recognized. By using a variety of tasks which differed in the 
specific role-taking skills required, the nature and complexity of the 
stimulus materials, and the types of responses required, both approaches 
have proved successful. That is, some investigators have demonstrated 
that children as young as three or four can "take the perspective of the 
other" (e.g., Masangkay, McCluskey, Mclntyre, Sims-Knight, Vaughn, & 
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Flavell, 1974; Fishbein, Lewis, & Keiffer, 1972; Marvin, Mossier & 
Greenberg, 1975; Maratsos, 1973; Yarrow & Waxier, 1975). Others have 
demonstrated equally convincingly that children younger than seven or 
eight are rarely able to be successful role-takers (e.g., Chandler & 
Greenspan, 1972; Flavell et al., 1968; Greenspan, Barenboin, & Chandler, 
1974; Laurendeau & Pinard, 1970), The inconsistent results and con­
flicting conclusions have made it difficult to specify the develop­
mental course of role-taking skills. 
Marvin et al. (1975) suggested that one difficulty with previous 
research is that role-taking ability has been defined only in functional 
terms — that is, in terms of successful performance on a particular 
task in a specific setting. This functional approach has perhaps di­
verted attention away from the logical processes involved in various 
role-taking activities. If the ability to take the perspective of an­
other person is a developmental cognitive characteristic, then investi­
gators must attempt to describe the manifestations of this characteris­
tic at all developmental levels. Further, they must attempt to 
elucidate the processes which occur in the developmental transition from 
the profound egocentrism of early infancy to the sophistocated role-
taking of adults. This approach is consistent with the theory of 
Piaget, who believes that rudimentary cognitive processes are present at 
birth and mature through a series of qualitative changes. Piaget, how­
ever, seems to have considered egocentrism only as a characteristic of 
thinking during the preoperational period, and not as a distinguishable 
developmental ability. Although recent theoretical statements by 
Elkind (1967), Looft (1972), Flavell et al. (1968), and Selman (1971b, 
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1974) have provoded the conceptual underpinnings for developmental re­
search, progress has been slow. More progress could perhaps be made if 
investigators made a greater effort to specify the performance require­
ments of the role-taking tasks they used and related these task re­
quirements to developmental theory. While some attempt to do this has 
been made in regard to perceptual role-taking in very young children 
(Masangkay et al., 1974; Flavell et al., 1968; Fishbein et al., 1972), 
little progress has been made in the areas of cognitive and affective 
role-taking. 
Cognitive role-taking requires a child to differentiate what he 
himself thinks or knows from what another person thinks or knows, when 
he and the other have different thoughts or information. One way to as­
sess this ability is to devise a situation in which the child is pro­
vided with information not available to another person. After the child 
has received this "privileged" information, he is asked whether the 
other person knows what he knows. Or he might be asked to predict the 
response of the other, a process which would require differentiation of 
perspectives and suppression of his privileged knowledge. 
Three different tasks have recently been reported in the litera­
ture, all using the "privileged information" approach, and all pur­
porting to assess the child's ability to take the cognitive perspective 
of another. A summary of the nature and cognitive requirements of each 
task is presented in Table 1. One task, developed by Chandler, Helm, 
and Smith (1974), consists of a series of "droodles". based on the car­
toon technique popularized by Roger Price (1953). Each droodle consists 
of a schematized line drawing which represents only a small part of a 
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Table 1 
Description of Task Requirements 
of Four Cognitive Role-Taking Tasks 
Task Information Processing 
Requirements 
Response 
Requirements 
Droodles 
Procedure I 
(Chandler 
et al. 
1974) 
1. Ability to understand that 
someone who has not seen 
the total picture will not 
know what it represents. 
2. Ability to infer that a 
person who has seen only 
the droodle has not seen 
the total picture. 
3. Ability to assume the per­
spective of a real "other" 
(a classmate) to whom the 
same task materials will 
be presented. 
4. Ability to maintain dif­
ferentiation between his 
own privileged perspec­
tive and another less 
informed perspective 
which he has never exper­
ienced. 
Willingness to 
admit that he does 
not know how the 
other will respond 
or 
Ability to construct 
a hypothetical re­
sponse which is 
plausible but 
incorrect. 
Droodles 
Procedure II 
(Chandler 
et al. 
1974) 
1. Same as 1 above. 
2. Same as 2 above. 
3. Same as 3 above. 
Ability to recall 
his response from 
the naive perspec­
tive. 
4. Ability to maintain dif­
ferentiation between his 
own privileged perspec­
tive and another less 
informed perspective 
which he has previously 
experienced. 
Ability to use his 
"naive" response 
as a basis for pre­
dicting the response 
of the other. 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Task Information Processing Response 
Requirements Requirements 
Story Task 
(Ambron & 
Irwin, 1974) 
1. Ability to understand that 
if the character did not 
see the middle two pic­
tures, he would not know 
what had "really" happened. 
2. Ability to infer that the 
character did not see what 
happened in the middle two 
pictures. 
3. Ability to assume the per­
spective of a symbolic 
"other" who is embedded 
within the task materials. 
Ability to under­
stand the logical 
inference implied 
by only the first 
and last pictures. 
Ability to use this 
logical inference 
as a basis for pre­
dicting the char­
acter's response. 
4. Ability to maintain dif­
ferentiation between his 
own privileged perspec­
tive and another less 
informed perspective 
which he has not directly 
experienced. 
Secret Game 
(Marvin et al., 
1975) 
1. Understanding that the 
person who does not see or 
hear the "secret" will not 
know the secret. 
2. Ability to infer that one 
person does not know the 
secret (signaled by an 
obvious cue). 
Ability to decide 
whether or not a 
particular person 
has a particular 
bit of knowledge. 
3. Ability to assume the per­
spective of two real "others", 
interacting in a group. 
4. Ability to maintain differentiation of 
perspectives while answering questions 
about the perspective of each person. 
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much larger scene. Viewed in isolation, the droodle is essentially un-
interpretable. But after seeing the whole picture, one can appreciate 
the droodle as a highly selective representation of the total picture. 
Several examples of droodles are presented in Appendix A. 
Chandler et al, (1974) presented the droodles in two different ways 
to children ages four, seven, and eleven years. In Procedure I, chil­
dren were first shown the completed drawing and asked to describe and 
label it. The drawing was then reversed, revealing only the abbreviated 
detail or droodle. The child was then asked to anticipate how the dro­
odle would be interpreted by one of his classmates, who was to be shown 
only that small detail (Chandler et al., 1974, p. 5). Chandler et al. 
believed that this presentation of the task required skills of abstrac­
tion and hypothetico-deductive thinking that are available only to chil­
dren who have attained the formal operational level of thinking. In 
order to respond correctly, the child had to assume a cognitive perspec­
tive that he himself had never experienced, for once one has seen the 
total picture, he cannot perceive the droodle in the same way as he 
would if he had seen only the abbreviated portion. Consistent with 
Chandler's prediction, the major increase in successful performance on 
this task occurred just prior to age eleven. Chandler's analysis of his 
task refers mainly to the child's cognitive processing of the stimulus 
elements; i.e., his ability to represent the stimuli from both his own 
and another perspective. However, the response requirements of this 
task would also seem to make it very difficult for young children. In 
order to produce a non-egocentric response, the child must either say 
that he doesn't know how his classmate would interpret the picture (a 
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response rarely given by young children), or he must think of a hypo­
thetical response which is plausible but incorrect. This latter re­
sponse would clearly seem to require hypothetico-deductive thinking 
and is quite difficult even for adults. 
In a different presentation of the droodles task (Procedure II), 
Chandler et al, (1974) first showed the child the abbreviated droodle 
and asked him to guess what it might represent. He was then shown the 
complete picture, prior to being asked to anticipate how his classmate 
would interpret the abbreviated droodle. Chandler et al. reasoned that 
this change in presentation served two functions. First, it provided 
the child an opportunity to experience the perspective of the other, as 
well as the perspective that would be uniquely his. This provision of 
shared experience was expected to facilitate the performance of children 
in the concrete operational stage, who still depend on concrete, per­
sonal experience to guide their thinking. Chandler et al. also made re­
ference to the different response requirements of this procedure. Be­
cause the child was required to construct a response from the naive 
perspective, he already had in his repetoire one concrete alternative 
to his privileged perspective. Although he was still required to anti­
cipate the response of another, which was ostensibly "hypothetical", a 
concrete alternative was readily available, if he was able to use it to 
mediate his response. Again consistent with Chandler's reasoning, the 
seven-year-olds were significantly more successful on this task proce­
dure than on the previous one. The preoperational four-year-olds, how­
ever, were no more successful with Procedure II than with Procedure I. 
A second cognitive role-taking measure is a story task used by 
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Ambron and Irwin (1974), which was based on the earlier work of Flavell 
et al. (.1968), The task included four story items, each of which con­
sisted of four pictures accompanied by a narrative. The task required 
the child to take the perspective of a character in the story who did 
not have all the information that the child himself had. The character 
was introduced at the beginning of the story (picture 1), temporarily 
disappeared (pictures 2 and 3), and reappeared in the final scene (pic­
ture 4). After being told the complete story, the child was asked a 
question requiring him to interpret the final scene from the point of 
view of the character who had just reappeared. In order to do this, the 
child had to discount important information which had been presented 
during the character's absence from the story scene. Examples of the 
story items and questions used by Ambron and Irwin (1974) are presented 
in Appendix B. Ambron and Irwin presented the task to five- and seven-
year-old children, and found a highly significant increase between the 
two ages in the number of responses that discounted the extra informa­
tion; i.e., non-egocentric responses. 
The story task has several similarities and differences in relation 
to the droodles tasks described above (see Table 1). The major simi­
larity, of course, is that in all three tasks the subject is given more 
information than is the "other" whose perspective he must take. In 
addition, the privileged information is surprising and amusing, and 
therefore, very salient. The child must suppress this salient informa­
tion in order to take the perspective of the other and accurately pre­
dict his response to a situation. It would appear, then, that both the 
droodles and the stories were tapping the same dimension of cognitive 
role-taking. 
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The presentation of stimulus materials in the story task is more 
comparable to Procedure I of the droodles task than to Procedure II. 
The child was first told the entire story and was then asked to inter­
pret the last scene from the point of view of the character who had just 
reappeared. Because he was not, asked to interpret the story without the 
privileged information, prior to being given that information, the 
child was not given the shared experience provided to subjects in Proce­
dure II of the droodles task. Although Chandlex- et al. believed that 
the shared experience was what accounted for the fact that seven-year-
old children performed successfully under Procedure II, but not under 
Procedure I, the seven-year-olds in the Ambron and Irwin sample were 
producing accurate role-taking responses without the benefit of shared 
experience. 
While the stimulus presentation in the story task was more similar 
to Procedure I of the droodles task, the required response was more sim­
ilar (but not identical) to Procedure II. Although the child had not 
shared the perspective of the other, he did not have to construct a 
purely hypothetical perspective. He had only to select one of two 
available alternatives — one of which was logical from the point of 
view of the character in the story, and one of which was objectively 
correct, but depended on having access to the privileged information. 
Thus, in both Procedure II of the droodles task and in the story task, 
the child had to choose between an egocentric but salient and objec­
tively correct response, and a relatively structured and potentially 
available non-egocentric alternative. In the droodles task, the alter­
native depended on the child's recalling his own construction of the 
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naive perspective, while in the story task it depended on his recogni­
tion of the only logical alternative available to the story character. 
In both cases, the child had to spontaneously produce the alternative 
prior to using it as a basis for predicting the response of the other. 
The seven-year-olds in the Ambron and Irwin study showed the same pat­
tern of successful performance as the seven-year-olds who received Pro­
cedure II of \he Chandler et al. study, even without the benefit of 
shared experience. This result suggests that the structuring of the 
response alternatives may have been a more important feature of 
Chandler's manipulation than was the provision of shared experience. 
Note, however, that preschool children were not able to perform success­
fully on either of the tasks described. 
One other difference between the droodles tasks and the story task 
should be briefly mentioned. In the droodles task, the "other" whose 
perspective was to be taken was a real person (a classmate) who was 
ostensibly going to look at the same stimulus materials the child had 
seen. In the story task, the "other" was a symbolic character who was 
embedded within the stimulus materials. It is not clear just how this 
difference might be expected to affect performance. 
A third task used to assess cognitive role-taking is the "secret 
game", devised by Marvin, Mossier, and Greenberg (1975). The task con­
sisted of an interpersonal situation in which the child, the experi­
menter, and the child's mother sa: in a circle on the floor, with two 
toys in the center of the circle. While the E. hid his eyes and covered 
his ears, the child and his mother (in whispered tones) chose one toy 
to think of as their secret. Without moving the toys, the mother and 
child indicated that they yere ready for tlie 12 to uncover his eyes and 
ears. The _E then asked the child three questions: 1) whether he (the 
child) knew what the secret was ("which toy you're thinking about"): 2) 
whether his mother knew; and 3) whether the E_ knew the secret. The 
questions were asked in random order, and the child had to respond cor­
rectly to all three questions for the response to be considered non-ego­
centric. The game was repeated twice more, once with the mother hiding 
her eyes, and once with the child hiding his eyes. The same three 
questions were asked each time, and, of course, the correct responses 
differed, depending on who had hidden his eyes. Each child was given 
a summary classification of "non-egocentric", if he made non-egocentric 
responses on at least two of the three repetitions of the game. 
The most striking difference between this study and the ones re­
ported above is that the major increase in successful performance occur­
red between ages three and four years. While only three of the 20 three-
year-olds were classified as non-egocentric, 19 of the 20 four-year-olds 
were. Yet, the secret game required the child to differentiate between 
knowledge that he had, based on privileged information, and the know­
ledge of another, who did not have the privileged information. It thus 
appears that this task was tapping the same role-taking dimension as did 
the droodle and story tasks. In addition, the preschoolers were able to 
perform the t;;sk without the benefit of previously shared experience, 
unless one assumes that the child was drawing on a prior history of occa­
sions on which he had been excluded from secrets. What makes this task 
so much easier than the droodles or the stories? 
Marvin et al. (1975) believed that their task differed from 
15 
previously used tasks in four important ways. First, it required the 
child "to distinguish between his own point of view and that of another 
where those perspectives are demonstrably different" (Marvin et al.f 
1975, p. 4). However, the difference in perspectives was made salient 
by the use of the term 'secret" (and accompanying whispering) and by the 
procedure of having IS hide his eyes and cover his ears. Second, the 
task was "as simple as possible, while still requiring the child to 
communicate his recognition that the perspectives differ" (Marvin et al., 
1975, p. 4). Unfortunately, the authors did not define just what it was 
that made this task simple enough for preschoolers. Third, the task 
reflected "situations which are quite natural to the child — situations 
which the child might be expected to encounter in his day-to-day activity 
within his family and peer group" (Marvin et al., 1975, p. 4). Fourth, 
in order to minimize wariness of strange adults, which could affect 
performance, the tasks included the child's mother and were administered 
in the home. 
The distinguishing features of the secret game, discussed by 
Marvin et al., seem to be of two types (see Table 1). One type includes 
the cognitive requirements of the task (which were not fully analyzed 
by the authors). The other type includes the use of familiar situations, 
adults, and test settings, rather than novel tasks and settings, and 
strange adults. The presentation of stimulus materials in the secret 
game differed in two important ways from that of the droodles or story 
tasks. First, the difference in perspectives was made quite explicit, 
by having E_ hide his eyes and cover his ears, by having the mother and 
child whisper, and by using the term "secret*" to refer to the privileged 
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information. Second, the privileged knowledge in the secret game (the 
choice of a toy) was not as novel and amusing as it was in the droodles 
or story tasks. The effect of both these features is to make the 
difference in perspectives in the secret game a more explicit and 
salient aspect of the situation than it was in the droodles or story 
tasks. 
Since one of the characteristics of the thinking of preoperational 
children is the centration of attention on the most salient aspects of 
a situation (Piaget, 1928), one would expect a task in which the role-
taking requirements were obvious and explicit to be easier for 
preschoolers than a task in which the role-taking requirements were more 
subtle or implicit. Thus, one variable which would be expected to 
affect performance on cognitive role-taking tasks is the explicitness 
of the task in defining the different perspectives. Flavell and his 
associates have demonstrated the importance of this variable in percep­
tual role-taking tasks (Flavell et al., 1968; Masangkay et al., 1974). 
They found that preschoolers were able to take the perspective of 
another when that perspective was signalled by a clearly defined label 
(upside down vs. right-side up). While the four-year-olds were not 
able to identify which aspect of a three-dimensional witch another 
person saw, they were able to tell whether the person saw the orange 
spot on the hat or the blue spot on the nose. Fishbein et al. (1972) 
also found that preschoolers could take the visual perspective of 
another if that perspective was made, explicit by a verbal label. The 
effect of explicitness in defining perspectives has not been directly 
investigated with respect to cognitive role-taking tasks. 
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The response requirements of the secret game also differed from 
those of the droodles and story tasks. In the secret game, the child 
was required only to make a simple decision as to whether or not a 
particular person knew something. The question asked by the E_ directly 
focused the child's attention on the crucial issue, and the child needed 
to respond with only a "yes" or "no." In contrast to the droodles and 
story tasks, he did not need to construct a hypothetical response, nor 
even to produce spontaneously a non-egocentric alternative based on 
previously shared experience or logical inference. 
The differences between the secret game and the other two tasks 
discussed suggest two possible reasons that children younger than seven 
years are unable to produce the responses required for the story task 
and for Procedure II of the droodles task. According to Piaget (1928), 
preoperational children are unable to simultaneously attend to and 
coordinate more than one aspect of a situation. In order to perform 
successfully on the droodles and story tasks, the child needed to 
simultaneously attend to and coordinate his own perspective, the per­
spective of the other, and the response the other was likely to make as 
a result of his perspective. The secret game, in which preschool 
children were successful, eliminated the need for attention to several 
perspectives simultaneously by asking a direct question which focused 
the child's attention on one dimension; i.e., whether or not the other 
person knew the secret. 
In the droodles and story (..asks, the child was not only required 
to attend to two perspectives, he had to produce spontaneously the 
non-egocentric alternative from memory or from simple logic. A second 
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possible reason for the failure of the preschool child on such tasks 
is that he is unable to perform this retrieval process. However, he 
might be able to consider the two perspectives if they were presented 
to him as concrete and equally available alternatives. A direct question, 
format, which has not been investigated, might thus present the child 
with two response alternatives from which to choose. The experimenter 
could ask the child if the "other" would think "X" (egocentric response) 
or if he would think "Y" (non-egocentric alternative). If the preschool 
child were able to respond non-egocentrically to such a question, the 
results would lend support to the proposition that children younger than 
seven years are able to simultaneously consider more than one perspec­
tive, if the perspectives are presented in explicit, concrete form. 
Statement of the Problem 
The present stiudy used two cognitive role-taking tasks to examine 
the relation between perspective-taking ability and two independent 
variables: 1) age, and 2) the explicitness with which the cognitive 
perspectives are differentiated in the task presentation. The effect of 
variation in response format was also explored through the use of three 
dependent measures for each task. The three response measures differed 
in the hypothesized level of cognitive cifficulty. The preceding 
analysis of the two tasks to be used (the droodles task and the story 
task) and the discussion of these tasks in relation to cognitive 
developmental theory, formed the basis for the following research 
questions: 
1. Is there a relation between performance on each of the two 
role-taking tasks and age? 
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2. Is there a relation between performance on each of the two 
role-taking tasks and the degree of explicitness with which the 
cognitive perspectives are differentiated in the task presen­
tation? 
3. Is there an interaction between the degree of explicitness of 
task presentation and age, with respect to performance on each 
of the role-taking tasks? That is, does the variation in 
explicitness of presentation have a greater effect on perfor­
mance (on each task) at some ages than at other ages? 
The three types of response for each task represented three hypo­
thesized levels of cognitive difficulty. The Level 1 response required 
the child to respond "yes" or "no" to a direct question about whether 
or not another person possessed a particular bit of knowledge. The 
Level 2 response required the child to choose between two structured 
alternatives in predicting the response of the other. One of the 
alternatives represented the child's own "privileged" perspective, and 
the other represented a non-egocentric alternative. The Level 3 
response required the child to predict the response of another without 
the benefit of structured alternatives. In this case, the child was 
required to produce spontaneously an appropriate, non-egocentric 
response. The responses at each level (for each task) were dichoto-
mously classified as "egocentric" or "non-egocentric." The following 
research questions were asked with respect to the variation in level 
of responses: 
4. Is there a relation between level of response difficulty and 
performance on each of the tasks? 
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5. Is there an ordered relation between the proportion of non-
egocentric responses and the level of response for each task? 
That is, will the highest proportion of non-egocentric responses 
occur when Level 1 responses are requested, the next highest 
proportion for Level 2 responses, and the lowest proportion 
when Level 3 responses are required? 
Hypotheses 
Based on the research and theory previously discussed, the following 
hypotheses were proposed: 
Hj^ There will be a significant difference among the mean scores 
for Level 3 responses on Task A for the three age groups. 
H2 There will be a significant difference between the mean scores 
for Level 3 responses on Task A for the tiro experimental 
treatments (Explicit'vs. Non-Explicit condition). 
H3 There will be a significant interaction between age and treat­
ment, with respect to scores for Level 3 responses on Task A. 
There will be a significant difference among the mean scores 
for Level 3 responses on Task B for the three age groups. 
There will be a significant difference between the mean scores 
for Level 3 responses on Task B for the two experimental treat­
ments (Explicit vs. Non-Explicit condition). 
Hg There will be a significant interaction between age and treat­
ment, with respect to scores for Level 3 responses on Task B. 
Hypotheses H^ and H^ stem directly from previous research using the 
same tasks and requiring responses that are designated Level 3 in the 
present study (Chandler et al., 1974; Ambron & Irwin, 1974). Tests of 
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these hypotheses constituted a partial replication of previous work. 
Hypotheses II2> H3, H5, and Hg were derived from the theoretical consi­
derations regarding task presentation discussed in the first section 
of this chapter. 
The following three hypotheses were derived from the theoretical 
considerations regarding response difficulty discussed in the first 
section of this chapter: 
H7 There will be a significant relation between level of response 
and classification of response (Egocentric vs. Non-Egocentric) 
on Task A. 
Hg There will be a significant relation between level of response 
and classification of response (Egocentric vs. Non-Egocentric) 
on Task B. 
Hg There will be an ordered relation between the proportion of 
Non-Egocentric responses and level of response; i.e., the 
highest proportion of Non-Egocentric classifications will occur 
for Level 1, the next highest proportion for Level 2, and the 
lowest proportion for Level 3. 
Significance of the Problem 
The major contribution of the present study is to help provide a 
clearer understanding of the developmental course of cognitive role-
taking skills. Although role-taking is thought to be a developmental 
characteristic (Elkind, 1967; Flavell et al., 1968; Looft, 1972), a 
comprehensive description of its developmental course is just beginning 
with respect to perceptual role-taking (Flavell et al., 1968; Fishbein 
et al., 1972; Masangkay et al., 1974), and has hardly been attempted 
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with respect to cognitive and affective role-taking (with the exception 
of Selman, 1971b, 1974). The existing studies have used very different 
tasks and have usually described performance only at the functional 
level of success or failure. As a result, the reported findings have 
frequently been inconsistent from study to study. Because the logical 
processes involved in the different tasks have not been specified, vary 
different conclusions have been drawn with respect to the age at which 
children can take the perspective of another (e.g., Marvin et al., 1975 
vs. Chandler et al., 1974; Borke, 1971, 1972 vs. Chandler & Greenspan, 
1972). The present study has attempted to clarify the logical processes 
involved in three cognitive role-taking tasks which have produced 
conflicting results. The study has contributed to a more complete 
description of role-taking abilities in young children, by manipulating 
task requirements in ways suggested by cognitive developmental theory. 
Several recent studies have suggested that role-taking may be 
related to other aspects of behavior, such as moral jugement (Ambron 
& Irwin, 1974; Moir, 1974; Selman, 1971a; Stuart, 1967), prosocial 
behavior (Rubin & Schneider, 1973), delinquent behavior (Chandler, 
1973), and emotional disturbance (Chandler, 1972; Chandler, Greenspan & 
Barenboim, 1974). Other studies have indicated that role-taking skills 
form an important basis for interpersonal understanding (Flapan, 1968; 
Feffer, 1959, 1960). If role-taking skills are related to, and possibly 
prerequisite to, a number of desirable behaviors, such as mature moral 
jugements, cooperation, and empathic understanding, it would seem all 
the more urgent to study its developmental course from its earliest 
beginnings to its most sophistocated forms. Once the developmental 
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processes have been more completely specified, investigators can begin 
to answer important questions about environmental influences which 
facilitate or retard the development of role-taking (Marvin et al., 
1975). Bearison (1975), for example, has asked what effect different 
organizations of parent-child relationships have on the development of 
role-taking. Other important questions might be: What characteristics 
of adult caretakers are related to development of role-taking in 
children? Do peer relationships facilitate the development of role-
taking? At what age do peer relationships begin to have a facilitating 
effect? Does opportunity and encouragement to engage in role playing 
or dramatic play facilitate the development of role-taking? The answers 
to these and other related questions may provide the basis for sugges­
tions tb parents and teachers who wish to facilitate the development 
of role-taking in young children. But it is difficult to study 
influences on development until one has specified the course of that 
development. 
If role-taking is an important ability which is related to other 
cognitive and social skills, it may also be useful to be able to assess 
an individual's level of development with respect to role-taking. Once 
the developmental course of role-taking has been more thoroughly 
described, it will be possible to develop a series of standardized tasks 
of graded difficulty which can be used to assess individual development. 
Such tasks could also be used to evaluate the effect of programs or 
procedures designed to facilitate role-taking. 
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Assumptions 
The logic of the present study rests on several assumptions. First, 
it is assumed that cognitive role-taking is a measurable ability, or at 
least a measurable component of a more general role-taking ability. It 
is also assumed that the two tasks used in the study (i.e., the scores 
derived from performance on these tasks) are valid indicators of cogni­
tive role-taking ability. Further, it is assumed that role-taking is 
a developmental ability; i.e., that different levels of the same 
basic ability are present and can be assessed at different ages. 
The two procedures of task presentation are assumed to represent 
two levels of explicitness, with respect to the differentiation of 
cognitive perspectives. The "Explicit" condition uses the word "secret," 
and it is assumed that all children within the age range sampled are 
familiar with this word. It is also assumed that the two procedures 
used with each task represent comparable levels of explicitness for each 
task. Although the procedure used in the "Explicit" condition is 
designed to make the task easier for young children, it is assumed that 
some role-taking ability is still required in order for the child to 
perform successfully. 
Finally, it is assumed that the three levels of response for each 
task represent three levels of difficulty, as suggested by cognitive 
developmental theory. Whether or not levels of actual performance are 
systematically related to the levels of response is an empirical 
question included in the study. 
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Limitations 
Results of the study have several limitations. Population restric­
tions limit generalization of the findings to individuals similar to 
those in the sample studied. Generalization must also be restricted to 
variables using the same operational definitions and measures. 
"Explicitness of Task Presentation" is a variable that could be opera-
tionalized in many ways. The findings shed light on the role of this 
variable only as it is defined by the specific procedures used in the 
present study. The two role-taking tasks are behavioral measures 
presumed to reflect the developmental construct of theoretical interest. 
But because of the limited evidence for the reliability and validity of 
the instruments, generalization about "cognitive role-taking" measured 
by other tasks or instruments is not warranted. Because the data were 
collected in an experimental setting, generalizations about the ability 
of children to take the role of another in naturalistic settings are 
also not warranted. 
Definition of Terms 
Role-Taking. This term refers to the ability to take the perspec­
tive of another person and to understand a situation from his point of 
view (Flavell et al., 1968). "Role-taking" is a general term which 
includes the ability to understand what another person sees, knows, 
thinks, or feels. 
Cognitive Role-Taking. This term refers specifically to the 
ability to understand what another person knows or thinks. It is one 
aspect or component of the multidimensional construct "role-taking" 
I 
(Ambron & Irwin, 1974; Marvin et al., 1975; Yarrow & Waxier, 1975). 
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Explicitness of Task Presentation. This term is used to refer to 
the clarity and salience with which the two cognitive perspectives (the 
child's and the "other's") were differentiated when the task materials 
were presented. In the "Explicit" condition, the word "secret" was used 
to refer to the child's privileged perspective, and the child was 
reminded that only he and the experimenter knew the "secret." In the 
"Non-Explicit" condition, no specific mention was made of the fact that 
the child and the "other" had different information. 
Response Level. This term refers to the hypothesized difficulty 
level of the three responses which were requested for each item on the 
role-taking tasks. Level I responses required a "yes" or "no" response 
to a direct question about what the other person knew. Level 2 required 
the child to predict the other's response by choosing between two 
structured alternatives. Level 3 required the spontaneous prediction 
of the response of the "other}" without the benefit of structured 
alternatives. 
Non-Egocentric Response. This term refers to responses to the 
items on the role-taking tasks which show clear evidence that the child 
has differentiated his own privileged perspective from the perspective 
of the other. Specific criteria for classifying the responses on each 
task as "Non-Egocentric" are given in Appendix E. 
Egocentric Response. This term refers to responses to the items 
on the role-taking tasks which show evidence that the child has failed 
to distinguish his own privileged perspective from that of the other. 
Specific criteria for classifying the responses on each task as 
"Egocentric" are given in Appendix E. 
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Task A. This term refers to the droodles task, described on 
pages 6 and 9. 
Task B. This term refers to the story task, described on 
pages 10 and 11. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Research on the ability of children to take the perspective of 
another person stems directly from the work of Piaget. As discussed in 
Chapter I, Piaget (1926, 1928) proposed that children younger than seven 
or eight years could view the world only from their own point of view 
and were unable to see a situation from another perspective. Piaget 
referred to this centeredness or embeddedness in one's own point of view 
as "egocentrismEgocentrism was thought to be an inherent aspect of 
the preoperational stage of Piaget's sequence of cognitive development. 
The marked decrease in egocentrism which Piaget observed at about eight 
years was attributed to the qualitative shift from the preoperational 
to the concrete operational stage of cognitive development. The in­
creased ability to decenter, or to take the perspective of another, was 
accompanied by increased ability to reverse thought processes, to 
understand the logic of classes and relations, and to attend to and 
integrate multiple aspects of a situation. 
Piaget's theoretical statements and limited empirical research 
emphasized the marked increase in perspective-taking ability which 
occurred at about eight years of age. His writings have left the 
impression that children younger than eight years are totally unable 
to take the perspective of another, while children over eight years 
are fully able to take the perspective of a specific, concrete other. 
(According to Piaget's theory, children are unable to take the 
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perspectives of various hypothetical others until they have attained 
formal operational thinking). 
More recent theoretical statements have suggested that the ability 
to understand the perspective of others develops more gradually over 
the period of early and middle childhood and into adolescence. Both 
Elkind (1967) and Looft (1972) have referred to a series of advances 
in the ability to decenter. They have not, however, specified the 
behavioral changes predicted to accompany each advance. Flavell and his 
associates have also taken a developmental view of decentering or 
perspective-taking ability (which they refer to as "role-taking"). 
Flavell's early work on role-taking and communication skills focused 
primarily on the developments which occurred during middle childhood 
and adolescence (Flavell, Botkin, Fry, Wright, & Jarvis, 1968). 
However, a small part of that early work and more recent studies have 
focused on the early development of role-taking ability in children ages 
two to five years (Masangkay et al., 1974; Flavell, 1974). Selman 
(1971b, 1974) has also been attempting to integrate developmental 
findings on role-taking into a developmental conceptual framework. Thus, 
the conceptual foundations for studying the development of role-taking 
are gradually being constructed. As the present review will show, 
however, we are far from a coherent description of the developmental 
course of role-taking. 
One source of confusion in the research presented below is that 
many of the studies have sought either to substantiate or to repudiate 
Piaget's theory regarding the age at which children can take the 
perspective of another. In their attempts to do so, investigators have 
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used tasks or instruments that differed in many ways from other tasks 
purporting to measure the same role-taking ability. The conflicting 
results have led to contradictory conclusions about the abilities of 
young children and to arguments about the criteria of "true" perspec­
tive-taking. It is beyond the scope of this review to fully analyze 
the similarities and differences among the many different tasks used 
to assess role-taking. However, major differences will be pointed out. 
A more thorough analysis of the three studies which directly guided 
the present research is presented in Chapter I. 
The following review is organized under three headings which repre­
sent three aspects of role-taking: perceptual role-taking (the ability 
to understand what another person sees), affective role-taking (the 
ability to understand what another person feels), and cognitive role-
taking (the ability to understand what another person thinks or knows). 
The section on cognitive role-taking is further sub-divided into 
research dealing with interpersonal communication and research dealing 
with the ability to predict the response of another person. As mentioned 
in Chapter I, Piaget, Elkind, Looft, and Flavell have referred to 
perspective-taking as if it were a unitary dimension. Although there 
is some evidence for a common "decentration" factor underlying perfor­
mance on a variety of role-taking tasks (Rubin, 1973), recent investi­
gators have suggested that role-taking should be considered a multidi­
mensional construct with several related but distinguishable aspects 
(Ambron & Irwin, 1974). The three headings which organize the following 
review represent the dimensions of role-taking most frequently 
distinguished in recent literature. The studies reported in each 
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section are divided into those which have been interpreted as supporting 
Piaget's theory regarding the age at which role-talcing ability is 
attained, and those which appear.to have demonstrated role-taking 
ability in children at an earlier age. The summary for each section 
will highlight some major differences in research strategies that could 
account for the discrepant results. The review closes with a short 
section on socialization experiences and role-taking. 
Research on Perceptual Role-Taking 
Research supporting Piaget's theory. Piaget based his conclusions 
about perceptual role-taking on the results of studies using his well-
known "three mountains" task (Piaget & Inhelder, 1956). In this task, 
children were presented with a three-dimensional pasteboard model and 
ten paintings representing different visual perspectives on the display. 
The children were to indicate which of the paintings represented the 
view seen by a doll which was placed in different positions around the 
display. The results, which have been replicated by Laurendeau and 
Pinard (1970), indicated that the ability to reproduce the different 
perspectives accurately was not well developed until early adolescence. 
Children younger than seven years invariably attributed their own 
perspective to the doll, regardless of where the doll was placed. On 
the basis of his data, Piaget hypothesized four stages in the develop­
ment of the ability to reconstruct the visual perspectives in the 
"three mountains" task. In the first stage, pure egocentrism, the 
child is unaware that a person who views the display from a different 
position will have a view different from his own. In the second stage, 
the child recognizes that the other should see something different, but 
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can still reconstruct only his ovra view. In the third stage, the child 
attempts to reconstruct a perspective other than his own, but may not 
be accurate in his reconstruction. In the last stage, the child can 
reconstruct the view of the other from several different perspectives. 
According to Piaget, children under seven or eight years would be in 
the first sta^e of pure egocentrism. 
Flavell et al. (1968) presented four perceptual tasks, similar in 
conception to the task of Piaget and Inhelder, to children in grades 
two through twelve. Their tasks, however, varied in the number of 
different dimensions that had to be considered in the reconstruction of 
the perspectives. The easiest task (representation of the side view of 
a single object) was successfully accomplished by only one-half of the 
second graders. The most difficult task (a display of three cylinders 
which varied in height and color pattern) was successfully performed by 
less than half of the eleventh graders. The results of this study 
suggest that successful performance on perceptual role-taking tasks is 
partly a function of task complexity. However, the findings also 
suggest, in support of Piaget, that the perceptual role-taking skill of 
children younger than eight years is extremely limited. 
Coie, Costanzo, and Farnill (1973) hypothesized that the ability to 
successfully reconstruct the perspective of another was a function of 
both age and the type of reconstruction required. They tested their 
hypotheses by using a three-dimensional display, consisting of three 
houses of different size and color, mounted on a board. They focused on 
three types of reconstruction processes, which they classified as 
"interposition"aspect," and "right-left," For the interposition 
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items, three pennies were placed on the board among the houses, and the 
child was asked how many pennies a doll saw when placed in different 
positions. For the aspect and right-left items, the child was to choose 
one of four pictures wli'ch repte? nt 'd the doll's vie\ of the display. 
The right-left item: sj -.iciiiic .lly re air•'d a differe . ; right-left 
orientation from that seen by the child. The three types of items were 
presented to children in kindergarten and grades two and four. As 
expected, t.-'-are was 0 significant main effect for age, with the kinder­
garten children making an average of 5.0 errors out of nine trials, while 
the second and fourth grrders made an average of 3.2 and 1,7 errors 
respectively. A significant main effect for error type was also found, 
with the interposition items being the easiest, and the right-left items 
the most difficult. The results of the study generally support P.iaget's 
findings, since major increases in successful performance occurred 
between five and seven years, and between seven and nine years. It is 
interesting to note, however, that the kindergarten children made an 
average of only 0.6 errors out of three trials on the interposition 
items. Thus, the five-year-olds in this study were able to giv.i pre­
dominantly non-egocentric responses when they were asked to tell how 
many pennies could be seen from another perspective. 
Research questioning Piaget's theory. In what they considered to 
be a preliminary pilot study, Flavell et al. (1968) devised a series 
of tasks which they thought would be valid measures of role-taking skill, 
but would be appropriate for preschool children. The tasks required 
children to 1) orient a picture so that the £ sitting opposite the 
child could see it right-side-up; 2) turn a card with a picture on each 
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side so that ha (the child) saw the same picture on his card that E_ was 
looking at on an identical card; 3) turn a cube so that he saw the same 
picture; that E_ was looking at on an identical cube; and 4) tell what 
picture E saw on his .side of a single card with a picture on each side. 
On the basis of data from 40 children between the ages of three and six 
years, the authors tentatively concluded that preschool children have 
some competence for visual perspective-taking. This competence consists 
primarily of the awareness of the existence of different perspectives. 
This awareness was manifested in the recognition of perspectives in­
volving the presence or absence of an object (E_ sees or does not see it), 
opposite views of objects placed between E_ and S_, and the up vs. down 
orientation of a picture placed on the table between E_ and _S. Flavell 
et al. recognized a number of variations in the stimulus characteristics 
and response requirements of their tasks that sLill ne^J to be explored. 
They stressed, however, that tasks assessing role-talcing activity in 
young children should explicitly request such activity, since their 
data indicated that preschoolers were not able to infer implicit role-
taking requirements of a task. 
As part of a larger study, Yarrow and Waxier (1975) used several of 
the perceptual tasks devised by Flavell et al. (1968), as well as some 
original ones. The tasks included 1) having the subject orient a 
picture of a child so that the _E (sitting opposite) could see the child 
"standing on his head"; 2) arranging a place setting (plate, knife, fork, 
and spoon) in front of the child and having him duplicate it for the _E 
sitting opposite; 3) having the child orient the photograph of a man's 
face so that it was "looking at" E_; and 5) having the child orient a 
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photo cube so that he saw the same picture that the _E was looking at 
on an identical cube. The tasks were presented to approximately 100 
children between the ages of three and seven years. Although statisti­
cal analyses of the data have not yet been reported, a preliminary re­
port stated that successful performance on the perceptual tasks 
increased with age, "with most substantial jumps occurring between 4*2 
and 5 years of age" (Yarrow & Waxier, 1975, p. 6). The studies by 
Flavell et al. (1968) and Yarrow and Waxier (1975) suggest that children 
between the ages of four and six years have more perceptual role-
taking ability than was recognized by Piaget. 
A series of three experiments by Masangkay et al. (1974) extended 
the research of Flavell et al. (1968) and explored the awareness of 
visual perspectives in children from two to five years. The tasks were 
designed to test the authors' hypothesis that awareness of whole-object 
perspectives (does E_ see or not see something?) would develop earlier 
than awareness of aspectival perspectives (what aspect of an object 
does _E see?). Stimulus materials included pictures and three-dimen­
sional toys, and involved seeing vs. not seeing, right-side-up vs. up­
side down orientations, and front vs. back perspective. On the task 
involving seeing vs. not seeing, half of the two-year-olds and almost 
all of the three-year-olds performed correctly. As was expected, the 
tasks involving aspectival perspective were mastered one to two years 
later than those requiring only whole-object responses. The most 
difficult task involved the recognition of the front vs. back perspec­
tive of a three-dimensional witch, plus the ability to match 15's 
perspective to one of three comparison witches. However, even this 
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task was performed successfully by 10 of the 12 five-year-olds. When 
the task was simplified so that the children were asked if E_ saw a blue 
spot painted on the witch's nose (front orientation) or an orange spot 
painted on the peak of the witch's hat (back orientation), three- and 
four-year-olds were easily able to respond correctly. These results 
suggest that young children may be able to differentiate between their 
own and another's perspective, if those perspectives are presented as 
explicit, concrete alternatives (seeing vs. not seeing an object, or 
seeing a blue spot or an orange spot) . The ability to reconstruct the 
aspect of an object seen by another appears >~o develop later than the 
ability to distinguish between two whole-object perspectives. 
Fishbein, Lewis, and Keiffer (1972) have further explored the meth­
odological aspects of the study of perspective-taking in young children. 
Forty children at each of th_ee ages (preschool, first grade, and third 
grade) were given one of four tasks which varied in stimulus complexity. 
The children were to respond to each task both by turning a lazy susan 
containing one or more toys so that I£ could see an aspect that was ver­
bally designated (e.g., "Show me the front of the moune and the side of 
the soldier holding his candy cane"); and also by pointing to the one 
among several pictures which represented the view seen by E_. The two 
dimensions of stimulus complexity varied were one toy vs. an arrangement 
of three toys, and the presentation of four vs. eight pictured views. 
Results indicated that performance was a function not only of age, but 
of mode of responding and stimulus complexity. When the response was 
turning, the performance of even the youngest children was almost error­
less, while the largest percentage of correct choices for this age group 
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on the pointing task was 75%. The task involving three toys was more 
difficult than the task involving one toy, and choosing among eight pic­
tures was more difficult than choosing among four. Mien the turning 
task was modified so that the desired aspect was designated by a photo­
graph rather than a verbal label, the task became considerably more 
difficult for the youngest group, though turning was still easier for 
them than pointing, especially in the three-toy task, Kurdek (1975) 
used a modification of this task, in which the subject had to turn his 
tray to indicate the aspect of the three-toy display that v/as seen by 
the IS, who was sitting opposite S_ with an identical display. Kurdek 
found generally low levels of performance in kindergarten through third-
grade children, with no improvement over the age range studied. 
Fishbein et al. (1972) concluded that an important aspect of 
stimulus complexity as defined in this study was availability of a 
salient perceptual cue. On the basis that one of the established char­
acteristics of the thought of the preoperational child is an inability 
to deal with relations among objects (Piaget, 1928), Fishbein et al. 
(1972) suggested that the preschool child depends on a salient cue even 
in dealing with the three-toy display. Provision of a verbal label (as 
in the original turning task) provided such a cue and could thus account 
for the successful performance of the youngest children. The pointing 
tasks required the child to select his own cues, an apparently more 
difficult task. It is interesting to compare the turning and pointing 
tasks used by Fishbein et al. (1972) to the task used by Flavell et al. 
(1968), in which the child had to indicate which of four sides of his 
cube matched the side of an identical cube facing 15. The cube task 
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appeared to fall mid-way in difficulty between the Fishbein et al. 
turning and pointing tasks (according to the percentage of correct 
responses at each age). While apparently more difficult than the turning 
task (perhaps because no verbal cues were given), it appears to have 
been easier than the pointing task (perhaps because the different per­
spectives were different whole objects rather than different aspects). 
It is also possible that the cube task was less difficult than the 
pointing task because the child was matching two concrete displays, 
rather than a concrete display and a pictured representation. 
Two other studies have provided evidence that preschool children 
have some ability to understand visual perspectives that differ from 
their own. Selman (1971b) used a house-like apparatus, consisting of 
three rooms, to assess perceptual role-taking in four- to six-year-old 
children. A person in the "watching" room could see through a window 
into the two other rooms, the "choosing" room and the "secret" room. 
A person in the "choosing" room, however, could not see into the "secret" 
room. Each subject took a turn sitting in the "watching" room and in 
the "choosing" room. From each vantage point, j3 was asked whether he 
or _E (seated in the other room) could see into more rooms, and whether 
he or 12 could see a toy in the "secret" room. S_ was also asked who 
could see into more rooms and who could see the toy if S_ and changed 
places. Selman found a significant increase in the accuracy of responses 
between ages four and five years. Ability to perform accurately on 
this task seemed to be achieved about a year later than successful per­
formance on the tasks used by Masangkay et al. (1974) to assess the 
ability to predict whether the IS could or could not see something. 
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A study by Shantz (1970) suggests another possible methodology to 
assess awareness of perspectives in young children. Three- and four-
year-old children were given the opportunity to look into a "peek-in-the-
box" with a window on each side. The box contained a three-dimensional 
display which could be surreptitiously rotated to provide an "expectancy 
violation" to subjects who were aware that the display should look 
different from the different sides. While there were no developmental 
differences between the three- and four-year-olds, about one-half of the 
preschool children clearly verbalized their awareness of the "trick." 
While, in this task, both of the perspectives were seen by the child 
himself, the "e.-pectancy violation" model might be er >loyed in assessing 
awareness of the perspectives of others. 
Summary. Taken as a group, the studies reported in this section 
suggest that perceptual role-taking ability is a function not only of 
age, but also of task complexity. The studies which appear to support 
Piaget's theory of egocentrism have used stimulus materials that were 
quite complex. That is, they have used three-dimensional visual dis­
plays, in which the elements varied in size, shape, color, and/or 
pattern. In order for the child to successfully reconstruct various 
perspectives on the display, he must be able to transpose all the 
relations among the stimulus elements, as they are seen from different 
positions. However, one of the characteristics of the thinking of the 
preoperational child, according to Piaget (1928), is the inability to 
understand the logic of relations. Therefore, the reconstruction 
process in these complex tasks would be expected to be too difficult 
for children younger than seven or eight years. The studies of Piaget 
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and Inhelder (1956), Flavell et al. (1968), and Coie et al. (1973) 
suggest that the ability to reconstruct perspectives on complex visual 
displays continues to develop throughout middle childhood and adoles­
cence. The more elements to be related, :he later the tasks are 
mastered. Several authors have pointed out that, if perspective-taking 
is defined solely in terms of such complex tasks, then children younger 
than seven or eight years will obviously appear to be unable to take 
the perspective of another (Borke, 1972; Fishbein et al., 1972; Marvin 
et al., 1975; Watson, 1975). 
The studies which have used "simpler" tasks have found clear 
evidence of perceptual role-taking in children as young as two years. 
The age at which children were predominantly successful varied from two 
to six years, depending on the specific task used. Although the tasks 
used with younger children are all described as "simpler" than the 
visi al d.' jplay tasks used with older children, the relevant dimensions 
of stimulus complexity which differentiate among the tasks have not 
been defined. One relevant feature, however, alluded to in several 
studies, is the concreteness and explicitness of the different perspec­
tives. The preschool children in the studies described performed most 
successfully on tasks in which the "other" perspective was a whole 
object or was made explicit by a verbal label (Coie et al., 1973; 
Fishbein et al., 1972; Masangkay et al., 1974). They performed less 
successfully when the perspective to be represented was an aspect of an 
object or group of objects (Coie et al., 1973; Fishbein et al., 1972; 
Masangkay et al., 1974). Another relevant feature of task complexity 
appears to be the type of response required. Preschool children 
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performed most successfully when asked a direct question with a specific, 
concrete answer (e.g., "What do I see?"), or when they were asked to 
manipulate the stimulus materials ("Turn it so I can see . . They 
were lers successful at reconstructing a visual perspective and matching 
it to one of several pictured alternatives (Goie et al., 1973; Fishbein 
et al., 1972; Masanglcay et al., 1974). These implications regarding the 
importance of explicitness of perspectives and type of response have 
had an important influence on the formulation of the present study. 
The differing results produced by studies using different stimulus 
materials and response modes suggest the need for more methodological 
research related to perceptual rolo-taking in preschool children. One 
goal of such research should be to specify the significant features of 
stimulus materials, task presentation, and response modes. When these 
features have been specified, role-taking tasks can be analyzed in terms 
of cognitive requirements and of the logical processes involved in 
successful performance. Specification of these logical processes will 
contribute, in turn, both to a coherent description of the developmental 
course of role-taking and to a cognitive developmental theory of role-
taking . 
Research on Affective Role-Taking 
Research supporting Placet's theory. Several studies have used 
tasks which required the subject to infer the motives or feelings of a 
person or persons, based on cues presented through a videotape, film, 
story, or tape recording. Gollin (1958) presented 712 children ages 
ten to sixteen years with a silent motion picture of an eleven-year-old 
boy who was portrayed in two scenes as being "good" and in two scenes 
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as being "bad." Following the film, the students were asked to write 
their opinion of the boy in as much detail as possible. The protocols 
were scored for 1) inference of motives underlying one or more aspects 
of behavior and 2) the attempt to synthesize the inconsistent behaviors 
into an overall concept of the boy. Specific criteria were developed 
for classifying the protocols as using inference and/or attempting to 
synthesize an overall concept. Interrater reliability for scoring the 
protocols was .91 for the "inference" category and .84 for the "concept" 
category. The percentage of children using inference increased from 
about 20% at age ten to almost 90% at age 16. The attempt to synthesize 
an overall concept occurred less frequently at all ages than the attempt 
at inference, with girls showing consistently more attempts at synthesis 
than boys in the oldest age group. Gollin concluded that the use of 
inference about another's feelings and motives is a relatively late 
development which begins during the transition from the concrete 
operational to the formal operational period. 
Flapan (1968) used two brief sound films to investigate the ability 
of children, ages six, nine, and twelve, to interpret the feelings, 
thoughts, and intentions that were expressed in a sequence of behaviors 
and interpersonal events. Each film was divided into five episodes, and 
following each episode, the film was stopped and the child was asked to 
tell the II what had happened ("Pretend I didn't see the movie and tell 
me what happened", p. 62). Following this, the child was asked several 
specific questions about the behavior and feelings of the characters. 
While there was no difference in the ability of the children at the 
three ages to describe expressive behavior or obvious feelings, there 
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was a major increase between six and nine years in the ability to 
describe intentions that were not obviously expressed. In these films, 
it is quite likely that obvious feelings were signalled by one salient 
cue (behavioral or situational), while the feelings and thoughts 
requiring inference also required the consideration of multiple or 
subtle cues. 
In a similar study, Rothenberg (1970) assessed the ability of 
children in third and fifth grades to accurately perceive and comprehend 
the behavior, feelings, and motives of actors in tape recorded short 
stories. Each story presented a dramatic interaction between a male 
and female and portrayed one dominant emotion. The subject was 
instructed to concentrate on one of the actors. The subjects' descrip­
tions of the behavior and feelings of the actor were scored (using a 
five-point scale) for 1) accuracy of descriptions of the feelings 
portrayed and 2) degree of understanding of motives. The two scores 
were combined into an overall social sensitivity score. The interrater 
reliability for this score was .91. Results showed that fifth graders 
had significantly higher scores than did the third graders. The 
difference between the two groups was especially noticeable with respect 
to the understanding of motives. However, even the fifth graders were 
not scoring at the highest level in the "motives" category. These 
results are consistent with the findings of Flapan (1968) and Gollin 
(1958) that the inference of feelings and motives continues to develop 
throughout middle childhood and adolescence. 
Several investigators have attempted to assess affective role-
talcing by asking children to interpret pictures or films in which the 
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facial expression of the story character was inconsistent or incongruous 
with the situational context. The assumption of these studies was that, 
if the child interpreted the character's emotion as being consistent 
with the situational context, he was projecting his own feelings rather 
than accurately perceiving the feelings of the story character. Burns 
and Cavey (1957) presented a series of pictures to 39 children, ages 
three to six years. The pictures included two birthday party scenes 
(one with no child pictured and one with a frowning child) and two 
dentist office scenes (one with no child and one with a smiling child). 
For the pictures with no child, the subject was asked how he would feel 
in the situation, while for the other pictures, he was asked how the 
child in the picture felt. An empathic response was one in which the 
reported feeling was consistent with the facial expression. As 
predicted, three- to five-year-old children were significantly less 
accurate in their jugement of the facial expressions than were five-
to six-year-old children. Burns and Cavey interpreted their results 
as indicating that the younger children inappropriately projected their 
own feelings into the pictures. However, Flavell et al. (1968) 
suggested that a more parsimonious explanation would be that the 
children failed to notice the incongruent facial expression in the 
context of the more compelling situational cue. 
In a similar study, Greenspan, Barenboim, and Chandler (1974) 
exposed 80 first- and third-grade children to one of two one-minute 
videotaped stories. In the "unambiguous" story, the feelings expressed 
by the central character at the end of the story were consistent with 
the situational expectancies from preceding events. In the "ambiguous" 
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story, the character's feelings were inconsistent with expectancies. 
Results showed no significant differences between responses of first-
and third-grade children to the general question, "How does he feel?" 
(100% chose a feeling consistent with the context in the unambiguous 
condition, and 80% did so in the ambiguous condition). However, when 
children were specifically asked to identify the facial expression, the 
third graders were significantly more accurate than the first graders 
in the ambiguous condition. Third graders were also significantly less 
certain of their jugements in the ambiguous condition than were the 
first graders. The findings of Burns and Cavey (1957) and of Greenspan 
et al. (1974) are consistent with the findings of Piaget that children 
under six or seven tend to center their attention on one aspect of a 
situation, rather than considering and synthesizing multiple cues 
(Piaget, 1928). This centration of attention on only one aspect of a 
complex interpersonal situation would be likely to lead to frequent 
misinterpretations of the feelings and motives of others. 
Ambron (1973) used three types of affective role-taking items with 
five- and seven-year-old children. The first type were items in which 
the child was to identify six affective states (puzzlement, anger, 
boredom, happiness, sadness, and fright) from pictures of facial 
expressions, gestures, and body postures. The second type required the 
child to select one of three pictured situations that was most likely 
to have produced a particular affect. The third type of item required 
the child to select one of two affective expressions that was most 
likely to have been produced by a particular situation described by IS. 
Items were given a score of 1 for appropriate responses and 0 for 
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inappropriate responses. As would be expected within Piaget's theoreti­
cal framework, seven-year-olds scored significantly higher on this 
task than did five-year-olds. Correct affect identification varied 
with the affect, with puzzlement, fright, and boredom being more 
difficult than happiness, sadness, and anger. Matching situations to 
affects was easier for both age groups than matching affects to 
situations. 
Research questioning Piaget's theory. The results of several 
studies of children's ability to identify affective expressions have 
been interpreted as evidence that children younger than seven or eight 
years can understand the feelings of others, even when these feelings 
differ from their own. Perhaps the earliest developmental study of 
social perception was carried out by Gates (1923). She used photographs 
of human faces which represented laughter, pain, anger, fear, scorn, 
and surprise. The pictures were presented individually to children 
three to fourteen years old. The child was requested to give a verbal 
description of the facial expression or emotion behind it. Results 
showed a gradual increase in the ability to interpret each picture with 
increasing age. Laughter was correctly identified by more than half of 
the children at age three, pain by more than half at age six, anger at 
age seven, fear at age ten, and surprise at age 11. Scorn was not cor­
rectly identified by more than half of even the oldest group. The pat­
tern of results suggested that the more obvious emotions (laughter, 
pain) were identified considerably earlier than were the more subtle 
emotions. In contrast to most of the studies reported below, this task 
required interpretation of a feeling in the absence of contextual cues, 
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which are an important source of information in many social situations. 
The responses also required quite advanced verbal labeling. 
Feshbach and Roe (1968) asked children to report on both their 
own and another person's feelings in a situation which emphasized 
contextual cues. Forty-six first-grade children were individually 
shown a series of slide sequences (three slides per sequence) with a 
narration. The slides portrayed situations in which the expected 
feelings were happiness, sadness, fear, or anger. After each sequence, 
the child was asked how he felt. The congruence between the child's 
reported feeling and the affect in the slide sequence was considered 
a measure of empathy. The sequences were presented again to 27 of the 
subjects, and they were asked to tell how the child in the slide felt. 
The accuracy of their jugements (based on adult standards) was used as 
an index of social comprehension. Results showed that all subjects 
showed accurate comprehension of the happiness and sadness situations, 
while 50% correctly labeled anger, and 20% correctly labeled fear. 
When responses were scored only as affectively positive or negative, 
all responses for all affects were correct. The fact that accurate 
social comprehension was not necessarily accompanied by empathy sug­
gested to the authors that these first graders were able to understand 
the feelings of another and to differentiate the other's feelings from 
their own. While empathy was systematically related to the similarity 
between the child and the stimulus person, social comprehension was not. 
Feshbach (1975) also reported the use of this task with kindergarten, 
first, and second grade children. Significant developmental gains were 
found for both social comprehension and empathy. When the visual and 
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auditory components of the task were separated, the highest social 
comprehension scores were elicited by the visual mode, while the highest 
empathy scores were elicited by the combined visual-auditory mode. 
Borke (1971, 1973) studied the ability of three- to eight-year-old 
children to select from among pictures of a happy, sad, angry, and fear­
ful face, the one which most appropriately matched a picture with 
accompanying story description. In two studies, a total of 776 Chinese 
and American children were individually tested. The children first 
identified each schematic face and were then asked to select the appro­
priate one for the blank face of the child in each pictured situation. 
While there were significant main effects due to sex, socioeconomic 
status, and nationality, the ability to recognize all four emotions 
significantly increased with age in all subgroups. At age 3-3.5, almost 
all American children correctly selected the happy face, 50% correctly 
selected the sad face, and 40% correctly selected the fearful face. By 
age 4-4.5, 70% correctly chose the fearful face, and by 6-6.5 years, 
88% were correct on sad responses. Anger was perceived least accurately 
at all ages and was frequently confused with sadness. Borke concluded 
that children as young as three years are aware that other people have 
feelings and that feelings vary according to the situation. She con­
tended that her results contradicted Piaget's conclusion that children 
younger than six or seven are egocentric. She attributed her findings 
to the greater sensitivity of her instrument to the capabilities of 
young children. 
In a reply to Borke's 1971 study, Chandler and Greenspan (1972) 
contended that Borke's conclusions represented "a major retreat in 
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conceptual clarity" (p. 104). They suggested that, since Borke's 
stories evoked predictable, stereotypic responses, the children may 
have been projecting their own responses to the situation rather than 
responding empathically or non-egocentrically. To support their 
criticism, Chandler and Greenspan reported data from a story task, in 
which a story sequence led to an expression of anger, fear, or sadness 
on the part of the main character. The task for the subject was to 
interpret the affect of the character in the last scene from the point 
of view of another character who had entered at this final point and 
did not know the cause of the emotional reaction. The results supported 
Chandler and Greenspan's hypothesis (and Piaget's theory) regarding age 
changes in performance, which occurred predominantly after age seven. 
However, the authors failed to mention that their task was also 
assessing cognitive role-taking, in that the child had to recognize 
that the late-arriving character did not know the cause of the affect. 
The task was thus not a simple test of awareness of affect in another. 
Several recent studies have attempted to reduce the problem of 
possible situational projection by using behavior and expressive cues 
to signal emotions which were inconsistent with situational expec­
tancies. These studies are similar in conception to the previously 
discussed studies by Burns and Cavey (1957) and Greenspan et al. (1974). 
Deutsch (1974) used a technique very similar to that of Greenspan et al. 
(1974). She used eight brief videotaped episodes, in which the final 
positive or negative affective expression of the main character was 
either congruent or incongruent with situational expectancies. Adult 
characters were used in the tapes to reduce the tendency toward 
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projection which might result from the child's identification with the 
actor. The tapes were presented to 48 girls, ages three and four years. 
The children were asked to retell the story after each episode. Using 
the scoring system developed by Rothenberg (1970), the protocols were 
scored for ]_) accurate description of affect, 2) accurate description of 
behavior, and 3) reasons for the final affective response. As expected, 
scores were significantly higher on the congruent episodes than on the 
incongruent episodes. While the scores were not significantly related 
to chronological age within the restricted age range sampled, there 
was a significant relation between performance and mental age. On the 
basis of her results, the author concluded that "bright young femaleo, 
can not only perceive affective responses, but also recognize intraper-
sonal cues and reasons for affective responses in both congruent and 
incongruent accounts" (Deutsch, 1974, p. 739). 
In another study, Deutsch (1975) used a series of three-card 
stories with lower-class three- and four-year-old children. The first 
and third cards portrayed the primary character alone in a context, 
and the second card portrayed the primary character and another char­
acter in a context. In all cases, the final affective expression of 
the primary character was incongruous with the interpersonal inter­
action. Each subject was shown three stories, all of which portrayed 
either male or female peer characters. Scores for accurate verbal 
responses about the primary character's affective responses and be­
havior were assigned on the basis of the subject's description of the 
card sequence. Correct identification of the final affective state 
was determined by the S/s choice of the first or third card, both of 
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which were replaced on the table. Correct identification of the 
reason for the final affect was determined by the S_' s choice of two 
pictured reasons. Performance on all dependent measures was signifi­
cantly related to mental age, a finding consistent with Deutsch's 
previous study (1974) . Performance on all measures was also more 
accurate on stories with same-sex characters than on stories with 
opposite-sex characters. This result is only partially consistent with 
the finding of Feshbach and Roe (1968) that empathy was related to the 
similarity between subject and story character, while correct affect 
identification was not. 
Watson (1975) used single pictures similar to those used by Burns 
and Cavey (1957). Half of the pictures presented a happy or sad 
expression congruent with the situation, while the other half presented 
incongruous expressions. Children in nursery school and grades one 
and four were asked to verbally identify the emotion being experienced 
by the child in the picture, and to report any feeling they had from 
looking at the picture. In contrast to the results of Burns and Cavey 
(1957), Watson's results showed that 96% of the nursery school children, 
97% of the first graders, and 86% of the fourth graders made emotional 
jugements that were consistent with the facial expression rather than 
the situational cue. In addition, at all ages, the child's report of 
his own emotion was independent of his jugement of the other person's 
emotion. Watson concluded that the youngest children in her sample 
appeared to understand the inner state of another, on the basis of the 
other's expressive behavior, even when the other's inner state was 
different from the child's own state. It should be noted that Watson 
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used only happy and sad expressions. The high proportion of correct 
identification of these expressions is consistent with the findings of 
Borke (1971, 1973) and Feshbach and Roe (1968), even though these 
latter studies used only congruous episodes. 
Iannotti (1975b) used a picture task very similar to that of 
Watson Q975). Six- and nine-year-old boys were asked to indicate how 
the boy in the picture felt and how they felt by pointing to one of 
eight drawings representing emotional responses. As in Watson's study, 
half the pictures presented expressions congruous with the situation, 
while the other half presented incongruous expressions. Iannotti's 
task included situations representing fear and anger as well as 
happiness and sadness. Correct identification of affect in the con­
gruous situations was at a high level for all subjects and did not 
increase with age. Correct identification of the facial expression in 
the incongruous situations occurred significantly less often than in 
the congruous situations and did not change with age. Although these 
results seem to conflict with those of Watson (1975), it must be 
remembered that Iannotti included four specific affects, while Watson 
used only happiness and sadness. Iannotti's task also required a 
pointing response which may have been more complicated than Watson's 
verbal labeling, even though it was non-verbal. Iannotti's results 
do not seem consistent with other findings of developmental change 
in correct identification of affects other than happiness and sadness 
(Borke, 1971, 1973; Feshbach, 1975). 
Kurdek (1975) also used a picture task presenting congruous and 
incongruous situations representing happiness, sadness, fear, and anger. 
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In contrast to lannotti (1975b), he found that correct identification 
of affect in congruous situations increased significantly between 
kindergarten and third grade, a finding consistent with the work of 
Borlce (1971, 1973) and Feshbach (1975). Also in contrast to lannotti 
(1975b), Kurdelc found that correct affect identification in the 
incongruous situations decreased significantly with age. This result 
is consistent with the finding of Watson (1975) that older children 
tend to use the situation as the most salient cue to affect, a tendency 
which would lead to incorrect responses in incongruous situations. 
Summary. The studies reported in this section indicated that 
children younger than six or seven years could identify the feelings of 
others, but only if these feelings were signalled by a salient behav­
ioral or situational cue. Where situational and behavioral cues were 
inconsistent, some evidence has suggested that young children tend to 
center on the situation (Burns and Cavey, 1957; Greenspan et al., 1974). 
These findings were interpreted as evidence that the children were 
projecting their own feelings into the situation, rather than accurately 
interpreting the feelings of the other. A recent study, however, found 
that nursery school children and first graders used facial expressions 
rather than situational cues in making emotional jugements from 
pictures of incongruous situations (Watson, 1975). Results of this 
study and two others (lannotti, 1975b; Kurdek, 1975) further suggest 
that use of situational cues increases rather than decreases with age. 
If young children tend to center their attention on the most 
salient aspect of a situation, as Piaget (1928) has suggested, they may 
focus on either the situation or the facial expression, depending on 
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which is most salient. Focusing on the situation will more frequently-
lead to inaccurate jugements, but only when the actual emotion is 
inconsistent with the usual situational expectancies, or when the 
person in the situation is not faking an emotional reaction (Iannotti, 
1975b). While the inability to focus attention on the multiple cues of 
situation and behavior is consistent with Piaget's description of 
preoperational thinking, this cognitive limitation may have little 
practical effect on the child's jugement of emotions in most simple 
behavioral situations. The studies reported in this section do 
indicate that only after age six or seven can children accurately 
interpret feelings that require consideration of multiple or subtle 
cues, and only in early adolescence do children begin to infer motives 
in complex behavioral situations. As was the case with studies of 
perceptual role-taking, successful performance on affective role-taking 
tasks seems to depend on the complexity of the stimulus situation. 
It is more difficult to integrate the studies of affective role-
taking into a cognitive developmental framework than it is to integrate 
studies of perceptual or cognitive role-taking. One reason for this 
difficulty is that it is not clear to what extent the various responses 
studied (e.g., identification of affective expressions, inference of 
complex feelings and motives, ability to empathize with another) are 
manifestations of the same construct; i.e., "affective role-talcing." 
As with the other areas of role-taking, the cognitive requirements and 
logical processes involved in the various affective tasks have not been 
specified. However, the study of affective role-taking is complicated 
by two other problems. One problem is that interpretation of affect 
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is based largely on socially and culturally conditioned relations 
between expressive behavioral cues and the verbal labels used to refer 
to feelings or emotions. Several of the studies reported above reflect 
developmental patterns of increasing discrimination among such behav­
ioral cues and verbal labels (Borke, 1971, 1973; Feshbach & Roe, 1968; 
Gates, 1923). Investigators of affective role-taking need to try to 
separate (logically at least) knowledge of socially conditioned rela­
tions, referred to by Chandler and Greenspan (1972) as "stereotypical 
responses from true affective perspective-taking. They must then 
attempt to evaluate the role of each of these dimensions in inter­
personal understanding. 
A second problem relating to the study of affective role-taking is 
that emotions are private and subjective, rather than public and 
objective. As Baldwin (1967) has pointed out, we have not discovered 
an underlying logic of interpersonal behavior comparable to the logic 
governing perceptual perspective-taking. Baldwin suggests that, 
because of the highly personal nature of affective perspectives, even 
adults must frequently use an intuitive approach to interpersonal 
understanding. Because affective perspectives are subjective rather 
than objective, we should be cautious about assuming that affective 
role-taking follows a developmental course directly parallel to that of 
perceptual or cognitive role-taking. Since affective role-taking is 
not the major focus of the present study, these very complex issues 
are only briefly mentioned. They indicate, however, that there is much 
work to be done on this dimension of role-taking ability. This work 
should build not only on the studies reported above, but on the 
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literature relating to interpersonal understanding stemming from 
sociology and social psychology. 
Research on Cognitive Role-Taking 
Studies of interpersonal communication. One way of demonstrating 
an awareness of the cognitive perspective of another person is to talk 
to that person in a way that takes into account what he already knows 
and does not know about the topic under discussion. Adults who are 
sophistocated role-takers do this every day, as they adjust their 
communication style and content to the various people they talk to. 
When asked directions to a new pizza parlor, one will (or should) give 
a different response if the asker has a working knowledge of the city 
than if he is totally unfamiliar with the area. According to Piaget, 
one of the features of egocentrism in young children is that, when they 
talk to someone, they actually believe that the other person already 
knows what he is telling them. Because the young child supposedly 
believes that the other person knows what he is saying, he makes no 
effort to make his message complete and specific. According to Piaget, 
it is not until seven or eight years of age that the child seriously 
begins to adapt his verbal communication to the needs of the listener. 
Following Piaget's early writings, a number of studies have 
assessed the ability of children to communicate with another person in 
a way that takes into account the cognitive perspective of the other. 
In their book on role-taking and communication skills, Flavell et al., 
(1968) have specified three criteria of adequate role-taking in 
situations involving interpersonal communication. First, the speaker 
must attend carefully to the listener. Second, the resulting image of 
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listener role attributes must act as a monitor of communication. That 
is, the speaker must adjust his message to fit what the listener does 
and does not know. Third, the monitoring requires real effort to 
suppress the more natural self-coding. That is, when one codes a 
message for himself, or for someone who already knows the message, he 
can use a much briefer and more cryptic style than he can if he is 
communicating with someone who does not know what he knows. When one 
takes the role of the other, he must suppress the tendency to use the 
briefer, more efficient coding (based on the assumption of mutual know­
ledge) and make an effort to give a more complete and elaborate 
message. Flavell et al. (1968) suggested that all studies of role-
taking should use these criteria. 
Empirical research on role-taking in communication tasks began 
with the early work of Piaget (1926). Piaget presented two tasks to 20 
six- to seven-year-olds and 30 seven- to eight-year-olds. In one task, 
children were told a story, which they were to reproduce for another 
child, who in turn was to reproduce it for the experimenter. In the 
second task, the child was shown a diagram of a tap or of a syringe, and 
was given an explanation of how it worked. Again, the child was to 
reproduce the explanation for another child, who in turn reproduced it 
for the adult. On both tasks, Piaget found that seven- to eight-year-
olds gave more specific, complete, and accurate reproductions than did 
six- to seven-year-olds. Piaget attributed his results to the incom-
municability of the young child's thought, which he considered to be 
an essential characteristic of egocentrism. While the younger children 
appeared to have an intuitive understanding of the meaning of the task 
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materials, they were unable to adequately verbalize their understanding. 
The improvement in communication skill reported by Piaget coincided with 
the qualitative change in thinking which he believed characterized the 
transition from preoperational to concrete operational thinking. The 
improvement most likely also coincided with school entry; and there is 
some evidence from Bruner and his associates (1966) that school entry 
is related to improvement in cognitive operations which depend on 
language. Thus, Piaget's studies may have required a level of linguis­
tic and cognitive response which prevented the younger communicators 
from making the necessary response, regardless of their awareness of 
the cognitive perspective of their listener. 
Flavell et al. (1968) developed several communication tasks which 
included 1) explaining how to play a game to two different listeners, 
one of whom was blindfolded and 2) composing a message designed to 
persuade a man to buy a necktie. The tasks were administered to chil­
dren in elementary and high school grades. Responses indicated a 
developmental progression in the adequacy of response, with a particu­
larly noticeable advance between eight and ten years of age. While the 
tasks varied in a number of dimensions, Flavell et al. pointed out that, 
in some cases, the relevant role attributes of the listener (e.g., 
knowledge, attitude etc.) were quite subtle, involving inference 
beyond the obvious, or consideration of multiple cues. In other cases, 
an adequate response required advanced verbal development or mastery 
of logical operations. 
Glucksberg and Krauss (1967) devised a communication task in which 
a listener had to select one figure from a set, based on a verbal 
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description provided by another person (the subject). The task was 
administered to pairs of individuals from three years to adulthood. 
Even the youngest children were able to communicate adequately when the 
figures were easy to encode. But when nonsense figures were used, the 
younger children tended to use short, idiosyncratic names, rather than 
effective analytic descriptions. The nonsense figure task discriminated 
smoothly over the age range studied, with adults immediately achieving 
an errorless performance. Glucksberg and Krauss also studied the 
response of children in grades K, 1, 3, 5, and college to listener 
feedback provided by _E. Even when the E_ indicated a lack of under­
standing of the description, the younger children most frequently 
failed to modify their response, either repeating the original descrip­
tion or remaining silent. 
Rubin (1973) used the Glucksberg and Krauss task and several other 
measures of egocentrism with 20 children in each of grades 1C, 2, 4, and 
6. The measures included a spatial egocentrism task taken from Flavell 
et al. (1968), a cognitive role-taking task (Miller et al., 1970), and 
a battery of five conservation tasks. Results showed a significant 
improvement in performance on the Gluclcsberg-Krauss communication task 
between grades K and 2, and between grades 2 and 4, but not between 
grades 4 and 6. Performance on the communication task was also 
significantly correlated with performance on the spatial, cognitive 
role-taking, and conservation tasks. 
ICingsley (1971) also used a communication task similar to the one 
used by Glucksberg and Krauss, and related performance on the task to 
performance on several other measures of egocentrism and to measures of 
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perceptual and linguistic ability. The measures of egocentrisin 
included a version of Piaget's "three mountains" task, a spatial per­
spective task presented entirely through pictures, and a story task 
used by Flavell et al. (1968). Kingsley found that the three tests 
of egocentrisin were related for third graders and seemed to reflect a 
common dimension. The measures were not related, however, for kinder­
garten children. Furthermore, while the communication performance 
of third graders was significantly related to the measures of egocen-
trism, the communication performance of kindergarten children was a 
function only of their perceptual and linguistic skill. Layton (1975) 
also found that linguistic skill, as measured by sentence length, was 
significantly related to role-talcing performance on a story task 
(similar to Flavell et al., 1968) in five- and six-year-old children. 
One problem with the Gluclcsberg-Krauss method of studying egocen-
trism is that the difficulty level of the required response is con­
founded with the awareness of the other's cognitive perspective. If 
the required description is very easy, the response may indicate 
spontaneous encoding rather than a serious attempt to make o:,e's 
message understood. On the other hand, if the required description is 
beyond the child's cognitive capacity, he will not be able to perform 
adequately, regardless of his intent to communicate. Borke (1972) 
made a similar point when she said that measures of role-talcing must 
be sensitive to other aspects of the child's cognitive maturity. Some 
new measures of role-taking skill might be devised which require 
responses which the child could make, but which he ordinarily would 
not make spontaneously. 
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A study by Maratsos (1973) provides evidence of the ability of 
three- to five-year-old children to adapt their communication to the 
needs of a listener when the response is appropriate to their cognitive 
ability. The tasks were presented through a game in which the experi­
menter rolled a toy car down a "hill" to the child who was seated on 
the opposite side of the table. Before the car was released, the child 
had to specify which of two toys he would like placed in the car. Half 
of the children played under conditions in which the IS could see nor­
mally; for the other half, the E_ was blindfolded. In addition, three 
variations of the task required responses representing three levels 
of descriptive difficulty. The easiest task required the child to 
specify a toy girl vs. a toy dog. The second level task required the 
child to choose one of two dogs which were identical except for color. 
The hardest task required the child to specify one of two identical 
dogs which differed only in their position in relation to the car 
(e.g., next to vs. away from the car). Responses were coded as "ade­
quate" or "inadequate" on the basis of whether or not the description 
was specific enough for the E_ to choose the desired toy. Results showed 
that even the youngest children used significantly more specific des­
criptive phrases under the "no vision" condition than under the "vision" 
condition. While there were only two pointing responses out of 144 
responses for the total sample in the "no vision" condition, the three-
year-olds used an average of 10.50 pointing responses out of 12 re­
sponses in the "vision" condition. While the three-year-olds clearly 
modified their typical response in the "no vision" condition, the five-
year-olds were more likely to use "adequate" verbal descriptions 
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even in the "vision" condition. Ma,ratsos also found that task diffi­
culty interacted with the vision conditions. The task requiring the 
raost difficult verbal description was performed less adequately than 
the others, even in the "no vision" condition. In contrast, the task 
requiring the easiest response was performed almost as adequately in 
the "vision" condition as in the "no vision" condition. The task 
requiring a response of intermediate verbal difficulty seemed to 
satisfy the condition of requiring a response which the child could 
make, but which he ordinarily would not make spontaneously. 
In addition to using structured communication tasks, Piaget made 
extensive recordings of the spontaneous language of two six-year-old 
boys. He reported that nearly half of their total spontaneous speech 
consisted of egocentric language; i.e., language not adapted to nor 
seriously intended to communicate with a listener. In a comparable 
study, Garvey and Hogan (1973) analyzed the verbalizations of children 
age three to five who were brought in pairs to play in a special play­
room for 15 minutes. The spontaneous speech records of the children 
were divided into utterance units; i.e., words, phrases, or sentences 
which conveyed a single message. The utterance units were coded for 
genuine communicative interaction, which was defined as sequences in 
which a message was followed by an appropriate verbal or nonverbal 
response. Results showed that 59% of the total speech output consisted 
of communicative exchanges. Younger children (3% to 4^) most frequently 
used single exchanges, while older children produced longer sequences. 
While Garvey and Hogan's results were not strikingly different from the 
results of Piaget, their interpretation of the data was. Piaget 
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considered the 50% of unsocialized speech that he found to be a signi­
ficant indicator of egocentrism. In contrast, Garvey and Hogan 
believed that the 59% of socialized speech they observed indicated a 
desire and an elementary ability to communicate meaningfully. 
Results of the studies presented in this section indicate that 
several of the tasks used to study the ability of children to communi­
cate adequately with a listener required verbal and cognitive skills 
that were available only to children older than seven or eight years. 
Once again, role-taking performance appeared to be at least partly 
a function of the complexity of the task stimuli and the cognitive 
demands of the required response. The one study that used much simpler 
stimuli and responses (Maratsos, 1973) found that even three-year-olds 
could change their communication as a function of different listener 
attributes. 
The significance of the spontaneous speech studies does not seem 
clear. The results of these studies raise several complex issues, such 
as the controversy about the development and function of socialized and 
private speech (debated by Vygotsky and Piaget in Vygotslcy, 1962). 
These issues, however, are not directly related to the concerns of 
the present study. 
Studies of the ability to predict the response of another. 
Another aspect of cognitive role-taking is the ability to predict the 
response of another person to a situation, based on a recognition of 
the knowledge and information which the other person brings to the 
situation. There have been several studies of this aspect of cognitive 
role-taking. Feffer and Gourevitch (1960) used a task developed by 
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Feffer (1959) to assess cognitive role-taking ability in six- to 
thirteen-year-old boys. The task consisted of a three-dimensional back­
drop scene and several miniature figures which the child was to use to 
make up a story. When the child had completed his story, it was read 
back to him, to remind him of the content. The child was then re­
quested to retell the story from the point of view of each of the char­
acters, keeping behaviors, feelings, and interpersonal cognitions 
consistent with the original version. Each of the child's stories was 
recorded verbatim. A scoring system was developed which indicated the 
degree to which the various stories reflected simple refocusing, 
consistent elaboration, or simultaneous reconstruction of several view­
points. "Simple refocusing" referred to the ability to change perspec­
tives but without maintaining consistency, "Consistent elaboration" 
referred to the ability to maintain consistency among perspectives 
considered sequentially but not simultaneously. "Simultaneous recon­
struction of viewpoints" referred to the consistent congruence between 
behaviors and interpersonal perceptions from all the various viewpoints. 
Role-taking ability, as indicated by higher scores on the role-talcing 
task, improved over the age span studied, with a marked improvement 
between eight and ten years. Scores on the role-taking task were also 
significantly correlated with scores on several Piagetian conservation 
and class inclusion tasks. 
Turnure (1975) used a modification of Feffer's role-taking task 
with seven-, nine-, and twelve-year-old children. She related perfor­
mance on the role-taking task to performance on two tasks which were 
used by Inhelder and Piaget (1958) to assess the transition from 
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concrete operational to formal operational thinking. While performance 
on all tasks improved with age, the Piagetian and role-taking tasks 
were not significantly correlated. Role-taking ability was related, 
however, to IQ in seven-year-old boys and girls and in twelve-year-old 
boys. Sullivan and Hunt (1967) also used Feffer's role-taking task 
with seven- to eleven-year-old boys. They correlated scores on the 
role-taking task with scores on Piaget's "three mountains" task. The 
scores on both measures showed a significant increase with age. 
However, the correlation between the two measures was substantial only 
at age eleven. These findings suggest that the relationship between 
cognitive role-taking skills and other cognitive abilities is quite 
complex. 
Building on the work of Feffer (1959), Flavell et al. (1968), and 
Selman (1971b), Selman and Byrne (1974) hypothesized four developmental 
levels of role-taking. Level 0 indicated "Egocentric Role-Taking." 
At this level, the child does not differentiate among points of view 
and shows no relation of perspectives. Level 1 indicated "Subjective 
Role-Taking." At this level, the child realizes that people in 
different situations feel and think differently. However, he is unable 
to simultaneously maintain his own and another perspective. Neither 
can he judge his own actions from another viewpoint. Level 2 indicated 
"Self-Reflective Role-Taking." At this level, the child can reflect 
on his own behavior and motivation as seen by others, but he still 
cannot coordinate several perspectives simultaneously. Level 3 indi­
cated "Mutual Role-Taking." At this level, the child can maintain a 
disinterested point of view and simultaneously consider several 
perspectives. 
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To test their hypothesized sequence of role-taking levels, Selman 
and Byrne asked children to retell two stories presented with film-
strips, each of which portrayed an open-ended moral dilemma similar to 
those developed by Kohlberg (1969). In a follow-up interview, specific 
questions were designed to assess understanding at each of the role-
taking levels. "In addition, open-ended discussion ... and role-
playing techniques were used further to assess level of role taking" 
(Selman and Byrne, 1974, p. 805). Subjects were assigned the highest 
level of role-talcing that was clearly evidenced during the interview. 
The stories were presented to a total of 40 children, ages four, six, 
eight, and ten years. Results showed a highly significant correlation 
between age and level of role-taking. Eighty percent of the four-year-
olds were respond.i.ng at Level 0, while 90% of the six-year-olds were 
responding at Level 1. Among the eight-year-olds, 40% responded at 
Level 1 and 50% at Level 2. At age ten, the predominant response 
level was Level 2. Even at this age, only 20% of the children were 
responding at Level 3. Selman and Byrne concluded that their results 
closely paralleled those of Feffer and Gourevitch (1960). 
Flavell et al. (1968) assessed cognitive role-talcing with a story 
task which consisted of a series of seven pictures which portrayed a 
complete sequence of events. When three of the pictures were removed, 
a different, but complete, story was suggested. After the child was 
told the seven-picture story, the three cards were removed, and the 
child was asked to predict the story which a second E would tell, based 
on the four pictures he saw. In order to tell the story accurately 
from the point of view of the 12, the child had to recognize that he had 
privileged information about the story sequence (based on the seven-
picture story) that was not available to a person who had seen only the 
four pictures. As he was retelling the story, the child had to maintain 
the distinction between his own and the other perspective, and suppress 
his own privileged information. The task was presented to children in 
grades two through twelve. The data indicated that a major improvement 
in performance occurred between grades thre.e and four, after which time 
performance became stable. Selman (1971a) used the same story task 
with a sample of 60 children, ages eight to ten years and also found 
a significant improvement in performance between these two ages. 
Kurdek (1975) also used the story task with children in kindergarten 
through third grade. The only significant improvement in performance 
occurred between grades two and three. Lay ton (.1975) used a very 
similar story task with five- and six-year-old children. He found le- , 
than 40% of his sample demonstrating role-taking ability, with no 
improvement between ages five and six. 
Chandler and Greenspan (1972) used a story task similar to the one 
developed by Flavell et al. (1968). The task consisted of several 
story sequences which logically led to an emotional response (anger, 
fear, or sadness) on the part of the child in the story. In the last 
picture, another child entered the story scene. The central character 
reacted to the second child in a manner appropriate to his affect, but 
did not reveal the cause of his feeling. Subjects in grades one 
through seven were asked first to tell the complete story, and then 
to retell the story from the point of view of the child who entered 
in the last scene. Many of the younger children made "egocentric" 
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errors by confusing their own privileged perspective with that of the 
"other," and assuming that the other would know the "real" reason for 
the central character's emotion. Chandler and Greenspan found a highly 
significant decrease in number of egocentric errors between ages six 
and thirteen, with the six-year-olds making errors on 85% of the 
responses, while the thirteen-year-olds made errors on only 4% of the 
responses. 
Ambron (1973) used a modification of Flavell's story task with a 
sample of 72 children in kindergarten and second grade. Her stories 
consisted of four pictures with accompanying narrative, Similar to 
Chandler and Greenspan's task, this task required the child to tak-. 
the perspective of a character in the story who did not have all the 
information that the child himself had. The character was introduced 
at the beginning of the story (picture 1), temporarily disappeared 
(pictures 2 and 3), and reappeared in the final scene (picture 4). 
After being told the complete story, the child was asked a question 
requiring him to interpret the final scene from the point of view of 
the character who had just reappeared. Ambron found a significant 
increase between five and seven years in the number of responses that 
discounted the privileged information, available to the child, but 
not to the story character. A more detailed analysis of the task is 
presented in Chapter 1. The use of this task in the present study is 
described in Chapter III. 
Another task used to assess cognitive role-talcing is a hiding and 
guessing game in which the subject is asked to predict the game be­
havior of another child, based on what the other knows about the nature 
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and object of the game. The task was developed by Flavell et al. 
(1968), and was also used by Selman (1971a), and lannotti (1975a). The 
task consisted of two boxes, one marked 25<? and one marked 10?, each 
with the appropriate amount of money inside. The object of the hiding 
game was to trick another child who was going to come and choose one 
of the boxes. The other child was to be allowed to keep the money from 
the box he chose. But the trick was that the _S was to remove the money 
from one box. Furthermore, the other child supposedly knew that E_ and 
S_ were going to try to trick him. The S_ had to decide which box to 
empty and give his reasons. For the guessing game, S_ was asked to 
choose one of two boxes that had presumably been fixed for him by 
another child. For both aspects of the task, the _S's level of role-
taking was based upon the reasons for his response, rather than on the 
response itself. 
Flavell et al. (1968) presented the task to children in grades two 
through twelve. Responses were scored as including 1) no recognition 
of motives, 2) a recognition of a simple motive of the other (e.g., 
wanting to choose the most money), or 3) a recognition of the other's 
recognition of the S_'s motives. Flavell et al. found a significant 
increase in higher level responses over the age span studied, with the 
most marked improvement coming between age eight and ten years. Selman 
(1971a) also found a significant increase in higher level responses on 
this task between ages eight and ten years. However, he found the game 
task to be more difficult than the story task, which he also presented. 
This latter finding is consistent with the findings of Gollin (1958) 
and Flapan (1968) that the ability to make inferences about human 
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motives develops later than the ability to understand the more obvious 
feelings, thoughts, and knowledge of the other. Ambron (1973) used the 
hiding game task with a scoring system of stages developed by Kuhn 
(1972). Scores for seven-year-olds were significantly higher than for 
five-year-olds, with the hiding aspect producing higher scores than the 
guessing aspect. Ambron thus appeared to be finding improvement on this 
task several years earlier than did Flavell et al. (1968) and Selman 
(1971a). Consistent with Selman (1971a), however, Ambron (1973) found 
the game task to be more difficult than the story task she also used. 
Iannotti (1975a) used the game task to assess the effectiveness 
of two types of role-taking training with six- and nine-year-old boys. 
The boys met in groups of five for 25 minutes a day for ten days. In 
one type of training, the boys took the role of one character in a skit 
involving all five boys. Each boy's attention was directed to the 
motives, thoughts, and feelings of the character he was portraying. In 
the second type of training, the boys switched roles and played the 
part of every character in the story. Changes in perspective resulting 
from different roles were emphasized. Performances in the hiding and 
guessing game showed a highly significant age difference and a signi­
ficant effect of training. The two types of training both improved 
performance and did not differ from each other. Iannotti also used the 
moral dilemma stories used by Selman and Byrne (1974) to measure role-
taking, but presented them without the filmstrips. Performance on this 
task was found to be less consistently related to age or to training, 
due to a significant relation between performance and the school 
attended. 
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Devries CI970) used a similar hiding and guessing game, in which 
children were asked to guess in which of the E_'s hands a penny was 
hidden. After a series of guessing trials, the _S was given the oppor­
tunity to be the hider in a series of trials. Scores were assigned to 
subjects on the basis of the game strategy employed, with perseveration 
and lack of competition receiving the lowest scores, simple alternation 
and recognition of the competitive nature of the game receiving higher 
scores, and the use of shifting strategies and intense competition 
receiving the highest scores. Since game strategy requires recognition 
of the behavioral and motivational roles of the other player, increasing 
scores were assumed to reflect increasing role-talcing ability. In a 
series of studies, Devries found significant increases in scores between 
ages three and seven years, with improvement on the hiding task 
preceding improvement on the guessing task. These results are consis­
tent with the findings of Ambron (1973). Although improvement in 
performance on Devries' task seems to occur several years earlier than 
similar improvement on Flavell's task, the scores on Devries' task were 
based on behavioral choices rather than on verbal justification for 
those choices. 
Several other tasks have been used to assess cognitive role-taking 
in children. All the tasks used the same general, paradigm of providing 
the child with information not available to another person. The child 
was then required to respond in a way that indicated a clear differen­
tiation between his own privileged perspective and that of the other. 
Chandler, Helm, and Smith (1974) used a series of droodles, each of 
which consisted of a schematized line drawing which represents only a 
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small part of a much larger scene. Viewed in isolation, the droodle is 
essentially uninterpretable. But after seeing the whole picture, one 
can appreciate the droodle as a highly selective representation of the 
total scene. Chandler et al. presented the droodles in two different 
ways to children ages four, seven, and 11 years. When children were 
shown the completed drawing first and then asked to interpret the 
droodle from the point of view of another, the major improvement in 
performance (based on a three-point scoring system) occurred between 
ages seven and 11 years. Mien children were first permitted to share 
the experience of the less-informed other, by seeing the abbreviated 
droodle first, the major improvement in performance occurred between 
four and seven years. The two procedures of the task are analyzed more 
fully in Chapter I . The use of the task in the present study is 
described in Chapter III. 
Yarrow and Waxier (1975) used a task consisting of an 18" x 24" 
display of a large cat in some bushes. From the front view, one could 
see only a fierce and snarling face coming out of the bushes. But from 
the back, it could be seen that the cat's hind leg was caught in a trap. 
In a procedure similar to the "shared experience" procedure of Chandler 
et al. (1974), the child was first asked to interpret the cat's expres­
sion from the front view (e.g., "He's mad," "fierce," etc.). After 
seeing from the opposite side that the cat was hurt, the child was 
asked to interpret the cat's expression from the point of view of 
another "naive" observer. Adequate role-taking was evidenced by inter­
pretations that did not include information about the cat being hurt, 
since this information was available only to the child. The task was 
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administered to approximately 100 children, ages three to seven, as 
part of a larger study. Although specific data have not yet been 
reported, a preliminary report indicated that the major improvement 
in performance occurred between four and five years. 
Marvin, Mossier, and Greenberg (1975) assessed cognitive role-
taking with a "secret game The task consisted of an interpersonal 
situation in which the child, the experimenter, and the child's mother 
sat in a circle on the floor with two toys in the center of the circle. 
While the E_ hid his eyes and covered his ears, the child and his mother, 
in whispered tones, chose one toy to think of as their secret. With­
out moving the toys, the mother and child indicated that they were 
ready for the E_ to uncover his eyes and ears. The E_ then asked the 
child three questions: 1) whether he (the child) knew what the secret 
was ("which toy you're thinking about"); 2) whether his mother knew; 
and 3) whether the E_ knew the secret. The questions were asked in 
random order, and the child had to respond correctly to all three 
questions for the response to be considered non-egocentric. The game 
was repeated twice more, once with the mother hiding her eyes, and 
once with the child hiding his eyes. The same three questions were 
asked each time, and, of course, the correct responses differed, 
depending on who had hidden his eyes. The task was administered to 
children ages two through six years, and the major increase in success­
ful performance occurred between ages three and four years. While only 
three of the 20 three-year-olds were classified as non-egocentric, 
19 of the 20 four-year-olds were. This task is analyzed more thoroughly 
in Chapter I. 
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In another study of children two- to six-years-old, Mossier, 
Marvin, and Greenberg (1976) used a simplified version of the story 
tasks used by Flavell et al. (1968) and Ambron and Irwin (1974). Each 
child was shown two short videotaped stories about children of his own 
sex. Each story consisted of a brief sequence of action and one 
spoken sentence which explained the action. One story, for example, 
showed a child walking across a backyard and into a house, with the 
accompanying sentence, "This boy/girl is going into his/her grand­
mother's house" (Marvin et al., 1976, p. 85). For each story, the 
child's mother was asked to leave the room, and the child was shown the 
videotape. The mother then returned and the videotape was shown again, 
but with the sound turned off. The child was then asked if the mother 
knew information about the story which was available only through the 
spoken narrative (e.g. "Does your Mommy know whose house the boy/girl 
went into?"). Responses were scored as egocentric or non-egocentric. 
The children were also asked to justify their responses. The answers 
were scored as incorrect or correct (i.e., based on the reasoning that 
the mother could not hear the sound or was out of the room when the 
sound was played). While only 5% of the three-year-olds were classi­
fied as non-egocentric, 60% of the four-year-olds, 85% of the five-year-
olds, and 100% of the six-year-olds were. Ability to correctly justify 
non-egocentric responses appeared to develop about one year later than 
ability to respond to the direct questions non-egocentrically. 
Selman (1971b) assessed the conceptual role-taking skills of four-
to six-year-old children by using a houselike apparatus, in which a 
person in only one of two rooms could see (through a window) into a 
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third room (see p. 38). Two dowels extended from the "choosing'1 room 
into the "secret" room. Two toys (e.g., a red airplane and a horse) 
were placed on the ends of the dowels in the "choosing" room. A third 
toy, which could be associated with either of the other two by one cue 
(e.g., a red Indian which could be matched either to the horse or to 
the red airplane) was placed in the "secret" room at the other end of 
one of the dowels. The actual placement of the toy was determined on 
the basis of the actual association made by the subject prior to the 
task; i.e., tha match was the opposite of that spontaneously made by 
the Si. One of _S's peers was seated in the "choosing" room and was told 
he would have to guess on which dowel in the "secret" room the toy was 
placed. Then E_ and _S went into the "watching" room where _S could see 
the correct placement. _S was then asked to predict the guessing 
response of his peer and to give a reason for his prediction. On the 
basis of pilot data, Selman defined four developmental levels of role-
taking ability. At the first level, the _S seems unaware of different 
perspectives and immediately predicts the "right" answer. At the 
second level, the _S indicates an awareness of the two perspectives, but 
is unable to predict the response of the other at all (e.g., may respond 
"I don't know"). At the third level, the JS is aware of perspectives 
and uses his own choice as a basis for prediction. That is, the S_ 
expresses an awareness that the peer cannot see the placement of the 
toy, but thinks he might make the same choice the _S himself had. At 
the fourth level, the _S uses his own response as a basis for prediction, 
but expresses awareness that the other person might make a different 
choice, based on a different reasoning process. In Selman's study, the 
four-year-olds were found to use mainly levels one and two, the five-
year-olds predominantly used levels two and three, and the six-year-
olds most frequently used level four thinking. 
The studies reported in this section have used a number of 
different tasks to assess cognitive role-taking. Evidence based on 
Feffer's role-talcing task (Feffer & Gourevitch, 1960), on the hiding 
game (Flavell et al., 1968; Selman, 1971a), and on story tasks (Chandler 
& Greenspan, 1972; Flavell et al., 1968; Kurdek, 1975; Selman, 1971a) 
indicates that a major development in role-taking ability occurs 
between ages eight and ten years. During this time, the child appears 
to become increasingly able to spontaneously reconstruct several differ­
ent cognitive perspectives on the same situation. This period of 
improvement seems to coincide with the consolidation of concrete 
operational thinking and the understanding of relations. 
Studies that have used easier tasks, such as the modified story 
task of Ambron (1973), the droodles task (Chandler et al., 1974), the 
"cat in the bush" task (Yarrow & Waxier, 1975), the moral dilemmas of 
Selman and Byrne (1974) and Selman's cognitive task (1971b), have 
found developmental advances in role-taking skill between ages four 
and seven. These advances have consisted primarily of development of 
awareness that other people may have different perspectives and of the 
ability to make simple predictions of the response of another. The 
studies by Marvin et al. (1975) and Mossier et al. (1976), which used 
very simple tasks (the secret game and videotaped stories), found a 
striking improvement in role-taking ability between ages three and four. 
The Marvin et al. (1975) study (analyzed in Chapter I) had an important 
influence on the design of the present study. 
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Socialization Experiences and Role-Talcing 
There has been very little research on socialization experiences 
that might influence the development of role-taking abilities. Three 
recent studies, however, have assessed the effect of social inter­
action on role-taking and other cognitive abilities. Hollos and Cowan 
(1973) and Hollos (1975) studied the effect of social setting on role-
taking and logical operations in seven-, eight-, and nine-year-old 
children. Three comparable social settings (a dispersed area, a 
village, and a town) were selected in Norway and in rural Hungary. 
Children were given ten tasks, including a visual perspectives task, 
a communication accuracy task (Piaget, 1926), and a story task (Flavell 
et al., 1968). For both national samples, there were significant age 
and setting effects. The socially isolated children performed less 
well than the village or town children on the role-talcing tasks. 
Extending the work of Hollos and Cowan (1973), West (1974) com­
pared the role-taking performance of kindergarten and third-grade boys 
reared in three different social settings in Israel. The three settings 
(kibbutz, moshav, and city) varied in the amount of peer contact 
children had. While performance on the visual and cognitive (story) 
tasks increased significantly with age, there was no effect due to 
social setting. The results of all three studies tend to support 
Hollos and Cowan's "threshold of verbal stimulation hypothesis." This 
hypothesis stated that: 
proper development of role-talcing skill requires a basic minimum 
of early social interaction, but that beyond this, differences in 
amount of such experience fail to contribute differentially to 
individual achievement (Hollos & Cowan, 1973, p. 1121). 
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Summary 
Taken as a whole, the research literature on perceptual, affective, 
and cognitive role-taking presents a relatively consistent, but incom­
plete picture. There seems to be no question that important develop­
ments in role-taking ability occur during middle childhood, especially 
between eight and ten years (Coie et al., 1973; Flapan, 1968; Flavell 
et al., 1968; Selman, 1971a; Sullivan & Hunt, 1967). These advances 
consist of marked increases in ability to construct complex perceptual 
and cognitive perspectives, and to maintain the simultaneous coordina­
tion of several different perspectives. The increases in role-talcing 
ability that occur between eight and ten years seem to coincide with 
development in other aspects of thinking that accompany the consolida­
tion of the concrete operational stage. 
Because the tasks used to assess role-talcing skill have frequently 
required concrete operational cognitive skills, the complexity of task 
requirements has been confounded with role-taking ability per se 
(defined as awareness of the different perspective of another). The 
result has been the premature conclusion that children younger than 
seven or eight years have essentially no role-taking ability. Only in 
the past few years have attempts been made to develop tasks that would 
tap the role-taking abilities of children with preoperational cognitive 
skills. Several investigators have made progress in describing the 
perceptual role-taking abilities that are available to children two to 
six years of age (Fishbein et al., 1972; Flavell et al., 1968; Masanglcay 
et al., 1974; Selman, 1971b). But only a few studies have begun to 
examine cognitive role-taking in preoperational children (Maratsos, 1973; 
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Marvin et al., 1975; Selman, 1971b; Yarrow & Waxier, 1975), As men­
tioned above, progress in the study of affective role-taking has been 
hindered by the difficulty of separating the social learning and 
cognitive role-taking aspects of affect identification. 
Two important variables that are suggested by the limited research 
on role-taking in preschool children are the complexity of task mate­
rials and the cognitive difficulty of the required response. One 
relevant dimension of task complexity appears to be the explicitness 
with which the various perspectives are presented to the child. The 
research on perceptual role-taking indicates that preschool children 
are most successful on tasks in which the different perspectives are 
clearly differentiated (Fishbein et al., 1972; Masangkay et al., 1974). 
A relevant dimension of response difficulty appears to be the number 
of cognitive operations the child must perform. The more difficult 
role-taking tasks required the child to spontaneously retrieve the 
information relevant to the various perspectives, and to hold this 
information in mind while constructing an appropriate (sometimes hypo­
thetical) response for the other. In contrast, the tasks on which 
younger children were successful asked the child to make a specific 
response to a direct question ("What do I see?") or to choose between 
two concrete alternatives ("Do I see a blue spot or an orange spot?"). 
These two variables — explicitness of task presentation and level of 
response difficulty — are explored in the present study. A more 
detailed discussion of these variables is presented in Chapter 1. 
It should be pointed out in closing this review that virtually no 
sex differences have been found in studies of role-taking. Only three 
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of the studies reviewed in this section reported significant sex 
differences. Ambron (1973) found the boys in her sample performing 
significantly better than the girls on the perceptual role-taking tasks. 
Borke (1973) found some sex differences in her study of affect identi­
fication. Gollin found that the girls in the oldest group of his 
sample made more attempts than the boys to synthesize the inconsistent 
behaviors of the boy in the film into an overall concept. Such 
findings, however, are rare. Although Maccoby and Jacklin (1974) do 
not report specific data for studies of role-talcing, they report 
essentially no sex differences for studies of related abilities, such 
as performance on Piagetian tasks, Kohlberg's moral jugement tasks, 
or on empathy (pp. 106, 116, 212). On the basis of this evidence, it 
was decided not to include sex as an independent variable in the 
present study. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHOD 
Overview of the Design 
The present study used a two factor design, with four primary 
dependent measures of cognitive role-taking ability. The two indepen­
dent variables were Age (three levels) and Explicitness of Task 
Presentation (two levels). Because sex differences have generally not 
been found in previous studies of role-taking (see Chapter II), sex 
was not specifically included as an independent variable. However, an 
equal number of boys and girls was included in each experimental group 
at each age level, and the data were examined for sex differences. 
Each child was presented with two cognitive role-taking tasks: 
a "droodles" task (Task A), developed by Chandler, Helm, and Smith 
(1974); and a story task (Task B), developed by Ambron and Irwin (1974). 
Both tasks required the child to differentiate his own privileged 
perspective from the perspective of a less-informed "other." Both 
tasks are described in detail in Chapter I and later in the present 
chapter. The independent variable, Explicitness of Task Presentation, 
was manipulated by varying the instructions given to the child during 
the presentation of the task materials. Children in the Non-Explicit 
condition were presented with both tasks according to Procedure I, 
while children in the Explicit condition received Procedure II. Details 
of the two procedures are described later in the chapter. 
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Following the presentation of each item for each of the two tasks, 
the child was asked three questions. All three questions required him 
to interpret the task materials from the point of view of the less-
informed "other." The questions differed, however, in hypothesized 
level of cognitive difficulty. The three types of questions are 
described more fully later in the chapter. The specific questions asked 
for each item on each task are presented in Appendix C. The responses 
to each item for each task were recorded on a response form and scored 
according to the procedures described later in the chapter. The 
scoring procedures yielded four primary dependent measures for each 
task: a Level 3 response score, a Level 3 subject classification (Ego­
centric or Non-Egocentric), a Level 2 subject classification, and a 
Level 1 subject classificatiou. 
Subjects 
The subjects were 120 children in nursery school and grades one and 
three. The nursery school children were obtained from two laboratory 
nursery schools and one day care center on the University of Maine at 
Orono campus. All four-year-old children in the three centers consti­
tuted the sample pool. Several children with physical or hearing 
handicaps were eliminated. From the remaining group of approximately 
45 children, 20 boys and 20 girls were randomly selected. The first-
and third-grade children were obtained from two elementary schools in 
small towns near Bangor, Maine. All first- and third-grade children 
in the two schools constituted the subject pool, from which 20 boys 
and 20 girls at each grade level were randomly selected. Several 
children at each grade level were eliminated prior to sample selection, 
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because they were judged by the principal to be retarded or to have a 
learning disability. Because of the uneven sex distribution in the 
limited subject pool, four third-grade girls from another small-town 
school were included in the sample. 
All subjects were Caucasian, with the exception of one nursery 
school girl who was Korean (but whose native language was English). 
At all three age levels, the sample included children from the wide 
range of socio-economic backgrounds represented in tlie Bangor area. 
The average socio-economic level of the nursery school group was some­
what higher than that of the older age groups, with approximately 50% 
of the fathers employed in professional positions (e.g., professor, 
attorney, accountant) and the remaining 50% employed in clerical, 
skilled and unskilled jobs (e.g., unskilled laborer, janitor, foreman, 
baker). In the first- and third-grade groups, approximately 25% of the 
fathers were professionally employed. The average socio-economic level 
of one of the elementary schools was higher than that of the other. 
However, the children in the two schools were evenly distributed 
between the two age groups and experimental conditions. 
Ages of the nursery school children ranged from 47 months to 60 
months, with a mean age of 52.73 months (4 years, 5 months) and a 
standard deviation of 3.62 months. The mean ages of subjects in each 
sex group and experimental condition v; ,_ied by less than two months. 
The ages of the first-grade children ranged from 73 months to 91 months, 
with a mean age of 80.28 months (6 years, 8 months), and a standard 
deviation of 4.15 months. The mean age of subjects in each sex group 
and experimental condition again varied by less than two months. The 
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ages of the third-graders ranged from 98 months to 115 months, with a 
mean age of 104.25 months (8 years, 8 months), and a standard deviation 
of 4,52 months. Again, the ages of each sex and treatment group varied 
by less than two months. 
All children in each of the classes selected (except nursery 
school) were tested. The 120 children who comprised the sample were 
randomly assigned by grade, sex, and school to one of the two experi­
mental groups (described below). The data from children not included 
in the sample were used to train the response form raters. The order 
of testing for the children in each class was randomly determined, and 
all children in one class were tested consecutively. 
The choice of sample size was based on considerations of the power 
of the statistical analysis presented by Cohen (1969). If a moderate 
effect size is hypothesized (approximately .50), the power of the 
analysis for the two-way interactions of an analysis of variance with 
one degree of freedom in the numerator is approximately .80. 
Tasks 
Droodles Task. Task A used the droodles technique devised by 
Chandler, Helm, and Smith (1974). Each droodle consisted of a sche­
matized line drawing which represented only a small part of a much 
larger scene. Viewed in isolation, the droodle was essentially 
uninterpretable. But after seeing the whole picture, one could appre­
ciate the droodle as a highly selective representation of a much 
larger scene. The child's task was to interpret the droodle from the 
perspective of a naive other, who had presumably seen only the selec­
tive detail. He had to do this even though he himself had seen the 
entire picture and thus had a "privileged" perspective. 
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The report of the droodles task by Chandler et al. (1974) gave 
little information regarding the reliability and validity of the task. 
Only the interrater reliability (r=.98) for the scoring of the responses 
was reported. No information was given on the internal consistency 
of the five items of the task, or on test-retest reliability. The 
validity of the droodles task is primarily face validity, based on the 
logical relation between the task requirements and the cognitive pro­
cesses being studied. The construct validity of the task is supported, 
however, by the fact that theoretically predicted patterns of response 
were found by Chandler et al. (1974), using two different manipulations 
of task presentation. 
Story Task. Task B used the story task developed by Ambron and 
Irwin (1974), which was adapted from the earlier work of Flavell and his 
associates (1968). Each story consisted of four pictures accompanied 
by a narrative. The task required the child to take the perspective 
of a character in the story who did not have all the information that 
the child himself had. The character was introduced at the beginning 
of the story (picture 1), temporarily disappeared (pictures 2 and 3), 
and reappeared in the final scene (picture 4). After being told the 
complete story, the child was asked to interpret the final scene from 
the point of view of the character who had just reappeared. In order 
to do this, he had to discount important information which was presented 
during the absence of the character from the story scene. 
The report describing the story task by Ambron and Irwin (1974) 
does not give the interrater reliability for scoring of responses. 
However, since the stories provided only two logical response 
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alternatives (an egocentric one and a non-egocentric one), agreement 
on the assignment of a score of 0 or 1 would be expected to be virtually 
perfect. Interrater reliability was computed for the scoring system 
used with the story task in the present study. Information on the 
internal consistency of the four stories was obtained by examining the 
difficulty levels reported by Ambron (1973), The percent of correct 
responses on the stories ranged from 38% to 79% for the five-year-olds 
and from 55% to 100% for the seven-year-olds. These figures indicate 
only a moderate degree of internal consistency among items. The test-
retest reliability coefficient reported by Ambron (based on half the 
sample) was .84 for a total role-talcing score, but was only .47 for 
the story task alone. The validity of the story task is also primarily 
face validity, based on the logical relation between the task require­
ments and the cognitive role-taking process. Construct validity is 
again supported by the fact that theoretically predicted patterns of 
response were found. 
Experimental Setting and Materials 
Each child was tested individually in a small room or area near 
his regular classroom. The experimental settings varied somewhat in 
the different schools from which the children were selected. The com-
com criteria of all experimental settings were that they 1) provided 
adequate lighting, 2) were relatively free of visual distractions (e.g., 
unusual equipment or interesting displays), and 3) were relatively free 
of noise and traffic. 
The experimental setting contained a small table and three child-
sized chairs. Two chairs were placed along one side of the table and 
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the other was placed at the end of the table. The child and the experi­
menter sat side by side, with the _E to the child's right. The task 
materials were kept in a box placed on the chair at the end of the 
table, within easy reach of the E_, but out of sight and reach of the 
child. 
The five pictures of the droodles task (Task A) were black line 
drawings(see Appendix A), drawn on 8" X 11" pieces of light blue poster-
board. An 8" X 11" blue posterboard frame fit over each picture. The 
cut-out "window" in each frame revealed the abbreviated droodle version 
of the picture. The frame for each picture was attached to the poster-
board in such a way that it could be flipped up to reveal the total 
picture. Each of the pictures was numbered on the back. 
The four pictures for each of the four story items were colored 
drawings representing the main events in each story. Each picture was 
drawn on a 4" X 5h" piece of posterboard which was then laminated. The 
four pictures for each story were stacked in sequential order and 
numbered on the back of the bottom picture. Each packet was kept 
together with a rubber band. 
The order of presentation of the five pictures and four stories 
was indicated on the response form prepared for each subject (described 
below). The task materials were arranged in the proper order before 
the E_ and the child entered the experimental setting. 
Experimenter 
The experimenter was a female graduate student in the School of 
Human Development at the University of Maine at Orono. She was a 
recent psychology graduate and had had experience testing young 
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children. The E_ was thoroughly trained in the administration of the 
various task procedures. Since the hypotheses of the study might have 
been apparent to a student of child development, the hypotheses were 
specifically discussed, as were the possible effects of experimenter 
bias (Rosenthal, 1969). When the E was thoroughly familiar with the 
task procedures, she administered the tasks to several children at each 
age, until she felt she could administer all versions smoothly and 
uniformly. 
The E! also became acquainted with the children to be tested. She 
visited each of the classes prior to data collection. On each visit, 
she spent time interacting with the children during their regular 
classroom activities. An attempt was made by the E_ to converse 
individually with as many children-as possible. 
Procedure 
Task A was presented in two different ways, providing two varia­
tions in the explicitness with which the two perspectives were differ­
entiated. Procedure I (Non-Explicit condition) was essentially 
identical to one of the presentations used by Chandler et al. (referred 
to in their study as Procedure II). When each picture was first 
shown to the child, it was covered with the cardboard frame which 
exposed only the abbreviated droodle. After being asked to guess what 
the droodle represented, the child was shown the complete drawing. 
After the child had described and labeled the complete drawing, the 
frame was replaced. The child was then asked to anticipate how his 
classmate (specified by name) would interpret the abbreviated droodle 
if the classmate saw only that small part. Procedure I served both as 
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a partial replication of the study by Chandler et al. CI974) and as an 
experimental contrast to Procedure J.X of the present study. 
Procedure II (Explicit condition) presented the droodles in a 
manner very similar to Procedure I, but attempted to make the differ­
entiation between the privileged perspective and the naive perpsective 
quite explicit. It was this explicitness of presentation which con­
stituted the experimental manipulation or second level of the indepen­
dent variable. After the child had been shown the abbreviated droodle 
and asked to guess what it was, the said that she was going to show 
the child a "secret As in Procedure I, the child was shown the 
complete picture and described and labeled it. After the frame had 
been replaced, the child was reminded that, while he and the IS knew 
what was underneath the frame, it was their secret. The child was then 
asked to anticipate the response of a classmate to the abbreviated 
droodle. The specific dialogue between the IS and the child for each 
picture is presented in Appendix C. 
Task A included five pictures which were presented in random 
order. Three questions were asked for each picture. These questions 
represented three hypothesized levels of cognitive difficulty. The 
first question required the child to predict the response of the other 
("What will he think?"). In this case, the child had to produce 
spontaneously an appropriate, non-egocentric response. This question 
was hypothesized to be the most cognitively demanding. It was also the 
type of response required in the original study by Chandler et al. 
(1974). The Level 2 question required the child to choose between two 
structured alternatives in predicting the response of the other. One 
of the alternatives represented the S_'s own privileged (egocentric) 
perspective, and the other represented a non-egocentric alternative. 
The order of presentation of the alternatives was randomized for each 
item. The Level 2 question was hypothesized to be less difficult than 
the Level 3 question. The Level 1 question required the child only to 
respond "yes" or "no" to a direct question about whether or not the 
other person possessed the privileged information. This question was 
hypothesized to be the least difficult. The questions were always 
asked in the same order — Level 3 first, then Level 2, and finally 
Level 1. All responses were recorded on the response forms described 
below. 
Task B was also presented in two different ways, providing varia­
tion in the explicitness with which the perspectives were differen­
tiated. Procedure I (Non-Explicit condition) was identical to the 
procedure used by Ambron and Irwin (1974). The child was first told 
the complete story, as he looked at the series of four pictures. He 
was then asked to interpret the last scene from the point of view of 
the character who had reappeared. As for Task A, Procedure I for 
Task B served as a partial replication of the study which originally 
used the task (with slightly different age groups). It also served as 
an experimental contrast to Procedure II of the present study. 
Procedure II (Explicit condition) presented the stories in a 
manner similar to Procedure I, but again attempted to make the differ­
entiation between the privileged perspective of the child and the less-
informed perspective of the character in the story quite explicit. The 
JZ described the first picture in the series, in which the character in 
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the story was introduced and then left the scene. The E_ then told 
the child that he was going to show him a secret about what happened 
while the character was gone. After describing the second and third 
pictures (in which the privileged information was presented), the _E 
reminded the child that, while he and the E_ knew what happened, it was 
their secret. The fourth picture was then described, and the child was 
asked to predict the reaction of the character who had just reentered 
the story scene. The specific dialogue between the IS and the child for 
each procedure is presented in Appendix C. 
Task B included four stories, which were presented in random 
order. As for Task A, three questions were asked in a standard order 
for each story. The questions represented hypothesized levels of 
difficulty comparable to those for Task A. The Level 3 question 
required the child to predict the response of the character without the 
benefit of structured alternatives. The Level 2 question required the 
child to choose between two alternative responses, and the Level 1 
question required the child to respond to a direct question about 
whether or not the character in the story possessed the privileged 
information. As for Task A, the presentation of the egocentric and 
non-egocentric alternatives for Level 2 was randomized for each of the 
four story items for each subject. All responses were recorded on the 
response forms described below. 
The distinction between the Non-Explicit condition (Procedure I) 
and the Explicit condition (Procedure II) was intended to be comparable 
for both Task A and Task B. That is, the two procedures (for each task) 
were intended to represent the same two levels of the independent 
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variable. The three levels of response were also intended to represent 
comparable levels of hypothesized difficulty for the two tasks. There 
was no basis for ?„ssuming, however, that the two tasks themselves were 
equally difficult. Each subject was given both tasks. The order of 
presentation of Task A and Task B was counterbalanced within each Age 
x Treatment group. Subjects who had been assigned to the Non-Explicit 
condition were given Procedure I for both tasks, while those assigned 
to the Explicit condition were given Procedure II for both tasks. 
Response Forms 
A response form was prepared in advance for each subject. The form 
served both as a record of the child's responses (recorded verbatim) 
and as a guide to the E_ in presenting the tasks in the correct predeter­
mined order (as determined by the various randomization procedures). A 
sample of the response form is presented in Appendix D. The first page 
of the form was for the task which was to be presented first (A or B). 
The page for Task A listed the numbers of the five pictures in the 
predetermined random order. Under each picture number was space for 
recording the child's naive response (prior to his seeing the whole 
picture), his Level 3 response (after seeing the total picture), and 
his Level 2 and Level 1 responses. The heading "Level 2" was also 
followed by one of two symbols: "(NE-E)," indicating that the non-
egocentric alternative was to be mentioned before the egocentric 
alternative; or "(E-NE)," indicating that the response alternatives were 
to be presented in the opposite order. The page for Task B listed the 
numbers of the four stories in the predetermined random order. Under 
each story number was space for recording the Level 3, Level 2, and 
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Level 1 responses. The order of presentation of response alternatives 
for the Level 2 questions was indicated in the same manner as for 
Task A. 
Attached to each response form was a cover sheet, including the 
following information: the child's name, sex, birthdate, and the 
experimental condition to which he was assigned. Also recorded on the 
cover sheet were the name of the school, the classroom teacher, and the 
date and time of testing. When all the data were collected, the 
response forms for all subjects in the study were shuffled and num­
bered from one to 120. The identification number was placed on the 
cover sheet and on both pages of the response form. The subject iden­
tification number was the only source of identification on the response 
forms. This procedure was followed so that the raters who scored the 
responses would not know either the age of the child or the experi­
mental condition to which he had been assigned. Because the response 
forms were shuffled before they were numbered, the numbering system 
provided no clues to age or treatment. 
Scoring the Responses 
Task A. The Level 3 responses of the droodles task were scored 
using a three-point scoring system developed by Chandler et al. (1974). 
Responses were given a score of 0, 1, or 2, depending on whether they 
were clearly egocentric, included some egocentric contamination or 
confusion, or were quite clearly non-egocentric. Specific criteria 
for the assignment of each score are given in Appendix E. Although 
Chandler does not mention the "I don't know" response, it was decided 
to give this response a score of 1, since the score of 1 represents a 
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transitional level between clear egocentrism and non-egocentrism. This 
decision was based on the work of Selman CI97lb), who found that 
inability or refusal to predict the response of another represented a 
developmental level between clear egocentrism and the ability to use 
one's own response as a basis for predicting the response of another. 
The scores used by Chandler et al. represented the amount of ego­
centric error, with a score of 0 indicating a non-egocentric response. 
In the present study, the scoring system was reversed, with a score of 
2 representing a non-egocentric response. Thus, higher scores in the 
present study indicate higher levels of role-taking ability. Scores 
for Level 3 responses on Task A have a range of 0-10. Level 3 responses 
were also classified as either egocentric (score of 0 or 1 according to 
the above criteria) or non-egocentric (score of 2 according to the 
above criteria). If the child gave non-egocentric Level 3 responses on 
at least four out of five pictures, he was given a summary classifica­
tion of "Non-Egocentric" for Level 3. 
Level 2 responses were given a score of 0 for choice of the ego­
centric alternative, a score of 2 for choice of the non-egocentric 
alternative, and a score of 1 for responses which appeared to be transi­
tional (e.g., selection of both alternatives, vascillation between the 
two alternatives, or "I don't know" responses). Level 1 responses were 
given a score of 0 for "yes" (the other does know what the complete pic­
ture portrays), a score of 2 for "no" (the other does not know the priv­
ileged information), and a score of 1 for answers which showed confu­
sion or uncertainty. Level 2 and Level 1 scores also have a range of 
0-10 for Task A. Four out of five non-egocentric responses (scores of 
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2) also resulted in an overall subject classification of Non-Egocentric 
for Level 2 and Level 1 responses. 
Task B. The story items in the original Ambron and Irwin study 
were given a score of "1 point if the subject discounted the extra in­
formation he had and took the perspective of the character in the story 
and 0 points if he did not discount the extra information" (Ambron & 
Irwin, 1974, p. 5). The Level 3 responses were scored using a three-
point scoring system derived (by the present investigator) from the cri­
teria used by Chandler et al. (1974). Each Level 3 response was given a 
score of 0, 1, or 2, depending on whether the response was clearly ego­
centric, reflected some awareness of the different perspectives, or was 
clearly non-egocentric. As for Task A, higher scores indicated higher 
levels of role-taking ability. The scores for Level 3 responses on Task 
B have a range of 0-8. Specific criteria for the assignment of each 
score are given in Appendix E. Inclusion of "I don't know" responses in 
the intermediate scoring category was based on the same reasoning used 
for the scoring of responses on Task A. The scoring system for Levels 2 
and 1 was the same for Task B as for Task A. The range of scores for 
Level 2 and Level 1 responses for Task B is also 0-8. Each response to 
Level 3, Level 2, and Level 1 questions was classified as egocentric if 
it had been assigned a score of 0 or 1, and as non-egocentric if it had 
been assigned a score of 2. The criterion for overall classification of 
each subject as "Non-Egocentric" for each level of response on Task B 
was three out of four non-egocentric responses. 
When data collection was completed, the cover sheets (containing 
identifying information about the subjects) were removed from the 
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response forms, and the forms for Task A were separated from the forms 
for Task B. The response forms were scored by two independent raters, 
one of whom was not familiar with the nature or purposes of the study. 
Data from pre-data-collection practice sessions and from extra children 
tested were used to train the raters. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
The scoring of responses for each task yielded a Level 3 score, a 
Level 2 score, and a Level 1 score, based on the responses to Level 3, 
Level 2, and Level 1 questions. From these scores were derived a Level 
3 subject classification (Egocentric or Non-Egocentric), a Level 2 sub­
ject classification, and a Level 1 subject classification, as described 
in Chapter III. 
Interrater reliability for the three scores for each task was com­
puted, based on the scoring of all response forms by two independent 
raters. The reliability coefficients, based on the ratio of disagree­
ments to total number of ratings, ranged from ,90 to .99, with an over­
all reliability of .95 for Task A and .98 for Task B (Table 2). Since 
the subject classifications for each task were based directly on the 
scores, no reliability for these measures was computed. 
Effects of Task Presentation and Age 
Task A. It was hypothesized that there would be a significant 
effect of age (H]^), a significant effect of experimental treatment (t^), 
and a significant interaction between age and treatment (H3) with re­
spect to Level 3 scores on Task A. The Level 3 scores for Task A are 
summarized in Table 3. Preliminary _t-tests for sex differences indicated 
no significant differences for the total sample, within age groups, or 
within treatment groups. Therefore, the data for boys and girls were 
combined. The scores for the six age x treatment groups were tested for 
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Table 2 
Interrater Reliability for Role-Taking Scores3 
Score Interrater Reliability 
Task A 
Level 3 .90 
Level 2 .95 
Level 1 .99 
Total .95 
Task B 
Level 3 .96 
Level 2 .98 
Level 1 .99 
Total .98 
a Based on two independent ratings of all response forms (tt. = 120) . 
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Table 3 
Mean Level 3 Scores on Task A for Children 
in Different Age and Treatment Groups 
Experimental 
Condition 
Age Groups 
Nursery School First Grade Third Grade 
Explicit 
Non-Explicit 
Mean = 4.60a'^ 
SD = 3.12 
Mean = 5.00 
SD = 2.85 
Mean = 8.25 
SD = 1.83 
Mean = 7.55 
SD = 1.96 
Mean = 8.25 
SD = 1.59 
Mean = 8.00 
SD = 1.62 
a n^ = 20 for each age x treatment group, 
k The range of scores is 0-10. 
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homogeneity of variance, using the F-max procedure (Winer, 1971). The 
result indicated that the variances were not homogeneous, F-max (6, 19) 
= 3.87, jd < .05. However, since the critical value of the test at the 
.05 level of significance was 3.76, the violation of the homogeneity of 
variance assumption was not severe. Since the analysis of variance pro­
cedure used has been found to be relatively robust to violations of the 
homogeneity assumption, this violation was disregarded (Glass, Peckham, 
& Sanders, 1972; Lindquist, 1953). 
The hypotheses regarding Level 3 scores on Task A were tested with 
a factorial analysis of variance for randomized groups with equal 
numbers of subjects per cell (Winer, 1971). The factors were age and 
experimental treatment. The results indicated only a main effect for 
age, _F (2, 114) = 27.47, £ < .001 (Table 4). Thus, hypothesis H]^ was 
supported, while hypotheses and H3 were not. Differences among the 
means for the three age groups were tested, using the Newman-Keuls 
procedure (Winer, 1971). The results indicated that the mean for the 
nursery school group differed significantly from the mean for the first-
grade group (JD < .01) and from the mean for the third-grade group 
(£ < .01). The means for the first- and third-grade groups did not 
differ. The proportion of the variance in Level 3 scores on Task A 
which can be predicted on the basis of variability in age was estimated 
by calculating the E_ statistic (Kerlinger, 1973). The result indicated 
the strength of the relationship to be .32, 
No specific hypotheses were made regarding age and treatment effects 
on Level 2 and Level 1 scores for Task A. These scores were summarized, 
however, and tested for homogeneity of variance. Since the homogeneity 
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Table 4 
Analysis of Variance of Level 3 Scores on Task A 
Source df SS MS F 
Age 2 276. 22 138. 11 27.47*** 
Treatment 1 1. 01 1. 01 .20 
Age x Treatment 2 6. 12 3. 06 .61 
Within 114 573. 25 5. 03 
Jt. 
p < .001. 
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assumption was not violated with respect to the Level 2 scores, a 
factorial analysis of variance was performed, with age and treatment as 
the factors. As for the Level 3 scores, results indicated only a main 
effect for age, (2, 114) = 15.79, £ < .001. Again, the Newman-Keuls 
analysis of the three age group means showed that the youngest group 
differed significantly from each of the older groups (_£_ < .01), while 
the two older groups did not differ from each other. The strength of 
the relationship between age and Level 2 scores on Task A was .22. The 
test for homogeneity of variance of the Level 1 scores for Task A 
showed such severe violation of the homogeneity assumption, that 
analysis of variance was not performed. Analysis of the Level 1 
responses with nonparametric procedures is reported below. 
. A series of chi square tests was also performed to assess the 
relation between age and subject classification for each level of 
response on each task. In contrast to the analyses of variance of 
scores reported above, this analysis contrasted children whose overall 
performance was classified as Non-Egocentric (according to scoring 
criteria) with those whose performance was classified as Egocentric. 
Because of the consistent absence of treatment effects for all levels 
of response on both tasks, responses for subjects in both experimental 
conditions were combined. The results of the tests are summarized in 
Table 5. The contingency coefficients indicate the strength of the 
relationship between age and subject classification for each measure. 
The chi square statistics for Level 3 and Level 2 responses on 
Task A indicated significant relationships between age and classifica­
tion of subject. Although these tests were not independent of the 
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Table 5 
Chi Square Tests of Independence Between Age and 
Subject Classification3 for Three Levels 
of Response on Task A and Task B 
Dependent Measure Contingency Coefficient 
Task A 
Level 3 9.90** .28 
Level 2 22.63*** .40 
Level 1 42.88*** .51 
Task B 
Level 3 49.90*"" . .54 
Level 2 23.66*"" .41 
J. JU J* 
Level 1 42.44 .51 
Subject classification refers to overall rating of Egocentric or 
Non-Egocentric. Criteria for classification are given in Chapter III. 
J.J. 
£  <  . 0 1 .  
J- J.Jf 
"" £ < .001 
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analyses of variance for the Level 3 and Level 2 scores, the strength 
of the relationships found and the consistency of the results support 
their validity. The chi square statistic for Level 1 responses on 
Task A showed a highly significant relation between age and subject 
o 
classification, x (2) = 42.88, £ < .001. The strength of the relation, 
indicated by the contingency coefficient, was .51. The relation 
between age and Level 1 scores on Task A was not previously tested with 
analysis of variance procedures, due to the violation of the homo­
geneity of variance assumption. 
Task B. It was also hypothesized that there would be a significant 
effect of age (H^), of experimental treatment (H,-), and of the inter­
action of age and treatment (Hg) with respect to Level 3 scores on 
Task B. These scores are summarized in Table 6. Again, preliminary 
_t-tests indicated no sex differences for the total sample, or within 
age or treatment groups. Therefore, data for boys and girls were com­
bined. The F-max test for homogeneity of variance within the six 
age x treatment groups indicated that the assumption of homogeneity 
was not violated. 
The hypotheses regarding Level 3 scores on Task B were tested 
with a factorial analysis of variance for randomized groups, with age 
and treatment as the factors. Results indicated only a main effect for 
age, ]? (2, 114) = 45.63, £ < .001 (Table 7). Thus, hypothesis was 
supported, while hypotheses H5 and Hg were not. The Newman-Keuls 
analysis of the means for the three age groups indicated that the 
nursery school group differed from the first-grade group Qd < .01) and 
from the third grade group (j> < ,01). The means for the first-i and 
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Table 6 
Mean Level 3 Scores on Task B for Children 
in Different Age and Treatment Groups 
Age Groups 
Condition 
Nursery School First Grade Third Grade 
Explicit Mean = 3.35a>b Mean = 6.15 Mean = 6.80 
SD = 1.84 SD = 1,93 SD = 1.32 
Non-Explicit Mean =2,90 Mean = 5.15 Mean = 6.85 
SD = 2.13 SD = 1.98 SD = 1.23 
n. = 20 for each age x treatment group. 
The range of scores is 0-8. 
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Table 7 
Analysis of Variance of Level 3 Scores on Task B 
Source df_ SS MS F 
Age 2 285.95 142.98 45.63*** 
Treatment 1 6.53 6.53 2.09 
Age x Treatment 2 5.52 2.76 .88 
Within 114 357.20 3.13 
^ 
2 < .001. 
107 
third-grade groups were also significantly different (p < ,01). As 
indicated by the E_ statistic, the strength of the relationship between 
age and Level 3 scores on Task B was .44. 
No specific hypotheses were made regarding age and treatment 
effects on Level 2 and Level 1 scores for Task B. These scores were 
summarized, however, and tested for homogeneity of variance. Since the 
homogeneity assumption was not violated with respect to the Level 2 
scores, a factorial analysis of variance was performed, with age and 
treatment as the factors. As for the Level 3 scores, results indicated 
only a main effect for age, _F (2, 114) = 20.81, £ < .001. Again, the 
Newman-Keuls analysis of the three age group means showed that the 
youngest group differed from each of the older groups (p_ < .01), and 
the two older groups differed from each other (j3 < .01). The strength 
of the relationship between age and Level 2 responses on Task B was 
.26. The test for homogeneity of variance of the Level 1 scores for 
Task B showed such severe violation of the homogeneity assumption that 
analysis of variance was not performed. Analysis of the Level 1 
responses with nonparametric procedures is reported below. 
The chi square analysis of the relationship between age and sub­
ject classification for Task B is summarized in Table 5. The chi square 
statistics for Level 3 and Level 2 responses indicated significant 
relationships between age and subject classification. Again, these 
results were not independent of, but were consistent with, the analyses 
of variance of the Level 3 and Level 2 scores. The chi square statistic 
for Level 1 responses on Task B indicated a highly significant relation 
ty 
between age and subject classification, x C2) = 42.44, < .001. The 
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strength of the relation, indicated by the contingency coefficient, 
was .51. As for Task A, the relation between age and Level 1 scores 
on Task B was not previously tested with analysis of variance proce­
dures, due to violation of the homogeneity of variance assumption. 
Effects of Response Format 
It was also hypothesized that there would be a significant relation 
between the level of response (based on Questions 1, 2, and 3) and the 
overall classification of the subject as Egocentric or Non-Egocentric. 
This relation was hypothesized for Task A (H7) and for Task B (Hg). 
The percent of subjects classified as Non-Egocentric for each response 
level on each task is presented in Table 8. Hypotheses H7 and Hg were 
tested with the Cochran Q test (Siegel, 1956) . This test, rather than 
the chi square test, was used, because the data for the three response 
levels were repeated measures rather than independent responses. 
The Cochran Q test for Task A indicated that, for the total 
sample, level of response was significantly related to classification 
of subject, Q (2) = 28.37, < .001. Thus, hypothesis H7 was supported. 
When Cochran Q statistics were computed for each age group separately, 
the relationship between response level and subject classification was 
found to be significant within the first-grade group (jj < .01) and 
third-grade group (g_ <. .001), but not within the nursery school group. 
Because of the consistent lack of treatment effects for all response 
levels on Task A, the relation between response level and subject 
classification within experimental conditions was not examined. 
The Cochran Q test for Task B also indicated that, for the total 
sample, level of response was significantly related to classification 
Table 8 
Percent of Subjects Classified as Non-Egocentrica for 
Three Response Levels on Task A and Task B 
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Group 
Response Level 
Level 3 Level 2 Level 1 
Task A 
Total Sample 
Nursery School 
First Grade 
Third Grade 
Task B 
Total Sample 
Nursery School 
First Grade 
Third Grade 
45.0 
25.0 
57.5 
52.5 
55.0 
12.5 
62.5 
90.0 
55.0 
25.0 
65.0 
75.0 
41.0 
17.5 
35.0 
70.0 
72.5 
35.0 
87.5 
95.0 
77.5 
42.5 
92.5 
97.5 
a Criteria for classification of subjects are given in Chapter III. 
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of subject, (2) = 51.82, £ < .001. Thus, hypothesis Hg was supported. 
Tests within age groups indicated the relationship to be significant 
at all three ages (jd < .001). Because of the consistent lack of 
treatment effects for all response levels on Task B, no tests within 
experimental conditions were performed. 
Hypothesis Hg stated that there would be an ordered relation 
between the proportion of subjects classified as Non-Egocentric and the 
level of response; i.e., the highest proportion of Non-Egocentric 
subjects would be found for Level 1 responses, a lower proportion for 
Level 2, and the lowest proportion for Level 3 responses. This hypo­
thesis was tested by comparing the actual pattern of classification 
in Table 8 to the expected pattern. 
For Task A, the expected pattern of classification was obtained for 
the total group and for each age group. According to the proportion 
of subjects classified as Non-Egocentric for the total sample, the 
Level 1 questions were the easiest, Level 2 questions were more diffi­
cult, and Level 3 questions were the most difficult. Thus, hypothesis 
Hg was supported for Task A. The relative difficulty of the three 
response levels differed with age. For the nursery school group, all 
three levels were quite difficult, with Level 1 only slightly easier 
than the other two levels. For first-graders, Levels 3 and 2 were 
both moderately difficult, while Level 1 was considerably easier. For 
third-graders, Level 3 was moderately difficult, Level 2 was consider­
ably easier than Level 3, and Level 1 was considerably easier than 
Level 2. 
For Task B, the expected pattern of classification was not 
Ill 
obtained (Table 8). According to the proportion of subjects classified 
as Non-Egocentric for the total sample, the Level 1 questions again 
were the easiest, but the Level 2 questions were more difficult than 
the Level 3 questions. This pattern of classification was consistent 
for the first- and third-grade groups, as well as for the total sample. 
Thus, hypothesis Hg was not supported for Task B. The nursery school 
children showed low levels of Non-Egocentric responding on Levels 3 and 
2, with considerable improvement on Level 1 questions. For first-
graders, the Level 2 questions were considerably more difficult than 
the Level 3 questions, which in turn were considerably more difficult 
than the Level 1 questions. For third-graders, the Level 1 and 3 
questions were both quite easy, while the Level 2 questions were more 
difficult. 
Comparison of Task A and Task B 
The relation between performance on Task A and performance on 
Task B was assessed in two ways. Pearson product-moment correlations 
between Tasks A and B were computed, using the Level 3 and Level 2 
scores. The correlation coefficients for the total sample and for each 
age group are presented in Table 9. While the correlations for the 
total sample were significant for the Level 3 scores (£ < .001) and 
the Level 2 scores (jj < .05), none of the within-group correlations 
was significant. 
The relation between task and subject classification was tested 
with the Cochran Q procedure. The percent of subjects classified as 
Non-Egocentric on Task A and on Task B for each level of response can 
be found in Table 8. The Cochran Q statistics for each level of 
112 
Table 9 
Pearson Product^Moment Correlations Between 
Scores on Task A and Task B 
Group Level 3 Scores Level 2 Scores 
Total Sample r » .49*** 
*
 C
M II H
 
Nursery School r_ = .24 r = -.22 
First Grade _r = .15 £ = .01 
Third Grade r = .19 r = .30 
* 
£ < *05. 
£ < .001.  
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response for the total sample and for each age group are presented in 
Table 10, Only three of the twelve statistics were significant. With 
respect to Level 2 responses, Task B was more difficult (i.e., elicited 
fewer Non-Egocentric responses) than Task A, for the total sample 
(£ < .02) and for first-graders Qd < .001). With respect to Level 3 
responses, Task A was more difficult than Task B for third graders 
(£ < .001). 
To assess further the consistency both within and between the two 
tasks, the difficulty level of each item within the tasks was computed. 
The difficulty levels for Task A are presented in Table 11, and those 
for Task B are presented in Table 12. The pattern of difficulty levels 
for Task A reflected the same effects of age and response level which 
were indicated by previous analyses. The difficulty levels also indi­
cated relatively high internal consistency among the five items of 
Task A. This consistency was greater for Level 1 responses than for 
Levels 2 and 3, and was greater for third-grade children than for first-
grade and nursery school children. There were no particular items on 
the task that were strikingly different in difficulty level than the 
others. 
The pattern of difficulty levels for Task B again reflected the 
effects of age and response levels indicated by previous analyses. 
However, the difficulty levels indicated considerably less internal 
consistency among the four items on Task B than was found for items on 
Task A. For Task A, the maximum difference in difficulty levels 
within any subgroup (age x response level) was .25, with the average 
discrepancy for the nine subgroups equalling .12. Xn contrast, the 
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Table 10 
Cochran Q Test of Independence Between Taska 
and Subject Classification^3 for Three 
Levels of Response 
Group Level 3 Level 2 Level 1 
Total Sample 9. = 3.43 4 = 6.15* Q = 3.60 
Nursery School 2 = 2.78 4 = .69 5.= 1.80 
First Grade 2 = .25 2 = 7.20** Q = 1.00 
Third Grade £ = 13.24*** .29 2 = 1.00 
a Task A vs. Task B, 
k Subject classification refers to overall rating of Egocentric or 
Non-Egocentric.. Criteria for classification are given in Chapter 
III. 
* £ < .05. 
JU -JU 
£ «? .01 
*** £ < .001. 
Table 11 
Difficulty Levels of Ilole-Taking Items on Task A for 
Three Levels of Response and Three Age Groups 
Response Nursery 
Level Item School First Grade Third Grade 
Level 3 1 .43 .58 .65 
2 .48 .70 .68 
3 .45 .75 .70 
4 .30 .60 .70 
5 .35 .75 .68 
Level 2 1 .60 .75 .75 
2 .35 .85 .85 
3 .58 .73 .80 
4 .45 .65 .85 
5 .43 .68 .75 
Level 1 1 .43 .93 .95 
2 .45 .93 .95 
3 .43 .88 .90 
4 .40 .88 .93 
5 .45 .88 .95 
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Table 12 
Difficulty Levels of Role-Taking Items on Task B for 
Three Levels of Response and Three Age Groups 
Response Nursery 
Level Item School First Grade Third Grade 
Level 3 1 .28 (.79): a .95 (1.00)b .98 
2 .13 (.38) .45 (.55) .60 
3 .40 (.59) .68 (1.00) .83 
4 .25 (.76) .68 (.97) .95 
Level 2 1 .40 .83 .93 
2 .35 .38 .53 
3 .23 .40 .70 
4 .33 .50 .85 
Level 1 1 .53 1.00 1.00 
2 .50 .83 .88 
3 .45 .93 .98 
4 .43 .88 .95 
Numbers in parentheses in the First Grade column indicate difficulty 
levels reported by Ambron (1973) for kindergarten children on the 
same items. 
k Numbers in parentheses in the Third Grade column indicate difficulty 
levels reported by Ambron (1973) for second grade children on the 
same items. 
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maximum difference in difficulty levels within a subgroup for Task B 
was .50, with an average discrepancy of .28. As was found for Task A, 
greater internal consistency was found for Level 1 responses than for 
Levels 2 and 3. The internal consistency was not greater, however, for 
third-grade children than for the other age groups. Much of the dis­
crepancy in difficulty levels on Task B was due to one particular 
item (item 2), which was consistently more difficult than the others. 
Table 13 presents the average difficulty levels for the role-taking 
items on Task A and on Task B, for each age group and each level of 
response. With respect to Level 3 responses, the average difficulty 
levels suggest that Task B was more difficult than Task A for the 
nursery school children, the two tasks were equally difficult for first-
graders, and Task B was easier for third-graders. With respect to 
Level 2 responses, Task B was more difficult for the nursery schou 
and first-grade children, while the two tasks were equally difficult for 
third-graders. With respect to Level 1 responses, the two tasks were 
equally difficult for all three age levels. 
Table 13 
Average Difficulty Levels of 
Task Aa and Task B^3 for 
Response and Three 
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Role-Taking Items on 
Three Levels of 
Age Groups 
Response Level and Age Task A Task B 
Level 3 
Nursery School .40 .20 
First Grade .68 .69 (.63)c 
Third Grade .68 .84 (.88)d 
Level 2 
Nursery School .48 .33 
First Grade .73 .53 
Third Grade .80 .75 
Level 1 
Nursery School .43 .48 
First Grade .90 .91 
Third Grade .94 .95 
a Average difficulty level is based on five items. 
k Average difficulty level is based on four items. 
c d 
» Numbers in parentheses are the average difficulty levels of the 
four story items reported by Ambron (1973) for five- and seven-
year-olds respectively. 
119 
CHAPTER -V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary 
The purpose of the present study was to assess the relation between 
cognitive role-taking ability and three independent variables; 1) age, 
2) the explicitness with which the cognitive perspectives were differ­
entiated in the presentation of the task, and 3) the type of response 
required of the child. A picture task (Task A) and a story task (Task 
B) were presented to a total of 120 children in nursery school, first 
grade, and third grade. Both tasks required the child to interpret t 
situation from the point of view of another person who had less infor­
mation about the situation than the child himself had. Half the chil­
dren in each age group received a task presentation procedure which 
emphasized the difference between the child's privileged perspective 
(referred to as a "secret") and the perspective of the other person. 
The remaining children received a task presentation procedure which 
made no explicit reference to the difference in perspectives. For each 
item on each task, the child was asked three questions, all of which 
required him to take the role of the other, but which differed in the 
hypothesized difficulty of the response required. 
The results indicated a significant relation between age and role-
taking performance. This relation held for both the picture and story 
tasks, and for all three levels of response on each task. No relation 
was found between explicitness of task presentation and role-taking 
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performance. Emphasizing the difference between the cognitive perspec­
tives did not facilitate role-taking for any level of response on 
either task. A significant relation was also found between role-taking 
performance and level of response. The Level 1 questions, which were 
hypothesized to be the easiest, elicited the highest number of non-
egocentric responses on both tasks. For Task A, the Level 3 questions 
were more difficult than the Level 2 questions, as expected. For Task 
B, however, the Level 2 questions were more difficult than the Level 3 
questions. 
Scores on Task A and Task B were found to be correlated for the 
total sample, but not within age groups. There were no systematic 
differences in difficulty between Task A and Task B. There was, how­
ever, more internal consistency among the items on Task A than among 
the items on Task B. 
Discussion of Results 
Relation of age to role-taking. The significant relation of age 
to role-taking performance found in the present study is consistent 
with the many other studies which have found developmental differences 
in cognitive role-taking ability (e.g., Ambron, 1973; Chandler et al., 
1974; Flavell et al., 1968; Selman, 1971b; Yarrow & Waxier, 1975). 
Comparison of the coefficients associated with the Level 3 scores 
on Task A (E^ = .32) and Task B . (E^ = .44) suggests that Task B was 
the more discriminating task over the age range studied. When Level 3 
subject classifications, rather than Level 3 scores, are considered, 
the difference in discriminability is even more clear. While the con­
tingency coefficient for the relation of age and Level 3 subject 
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classification for Task A was .28, the comparable coefficient for Task 
B was .54. The average difficulty levels for the Level 3 questions on 
Tasks A and B indicated that Task B was more difficult than Task A for 
nursery school children but much easier for third-graders. 
It is interesting to compare the results of the present study, 
with respect to Level 3 scores on Task A, to the findings reported by 
Chandler et al. (1974), who used the same task and procedure. Chandler 
et al. found the most marked improvement in performance between ages 
four and seven, but found further significant improvement between ages 
seven and eleven. These findings are consistent with those of the 
present study. Level 3 performance on Task A in the present study 
showed marked improvement between ages four and eight (Table 3). How­
ever, the performance of the eight-year-olds was far from perfect. For 
the eight-year-old group, the average difficulty level for Level 3 
questions on Task A was .68, and only 52.5% of this group were classi­
fied as consistently non-egocentric (see Tables 7 and 13). For the 
present sample, the major improvement occurred between ages four and 
six, with no further improvement between ages six and eight. 
It is also interesting to compare the results of Task B (Level 3) 
to those reported by Ambron (1973), who used the same task,, Ambron 
found significant improvement in cognitive role-taking performance 
between ages five and seven, while the present study found significant 
improvement between ages four and six and between ages six and eight 
(Table 6). A comparison of the average difficulty levels of the items 
in the story task helps to clarify the pattern of age changes. The 
average difficulty level of the Level 3 questions for the four-year-olds 
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in the present sample was .20. The average difficulty levels for the 
five-year-olds in the Ambron sample and the six-year-olds in the pre­
sent sample were .63 and .69 respectively. The average difficulty 
levels for the seven-year-olds in the Ambron sample and the eight-year-
olds in the present sample were .88 and .84 respectively. This compar­
ison indicates that the major improvements in performance on this task 
occur between four and five years and between six and seven years. 
The results of the present study, in conjunction with those of 
Chandler et al. (1974) and Ambron (1973), suggest that a major develop­
ment in role-taking ability occurs between ages four and five years. 
This conclusion is consistent with several recent reports by Mossier 
et al. (1976), Selman (1971b), and Yarrow and Waxier (1975). Although 
another significant improvement on the story task (Task B) was found 
between ages six and seven, no further improvement on the picture task 
(Task A) occurred. 
Careful examination of the Level 3 responses to the two tasks 
suggests a reason for the greater apparent discriminability over age of 
Task B, and for the poorer performance of the third-graders on Task A 
than on Task B. This reason is that children said they did not know 
what the other person would say much more frequently when responding to 
the pictures than when responding to the stories. Out of a total of 
600 responses to the picture items, 13.5% were "I don't know," while 
only 6% of the 480 responses to the story items were "1 don't know." 
In addition, the relation of age to "I don't know" responses was 
different for the two tasks. On the picture task, 50% of the "I don't 
know" responses were given by the third-graders, 25% by the 
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first-graders, and 25% by the nursery school children. On the story 
task, only 7% of the "I don't know" responses were given by the third-
graders, 14% by the first-graders, and 79% by the nursery school 
children. 
Examination of the cognitive requirements of the two tasks suggests 
that the "I don't know" response was more likely to be elicited on the 
picture task than on the story task. When predicting the response of 
another to one of the droodles, the number of possible responses is very 
large, and the child may be quite accurate in saying that he does not 
know what the other person will say. In fact, several children (all 
third-graders) followed their "I don't know" response with a comment 
such as, "Ask him," or "Different people say different things," or 
"I'm not a mind reader." Such comments clearly suggest an awareness of 
the other's different perspective. Selman (1971b) did find that "I 
don't know" responses developmentally preceded the ability to use one's 
own response as a basis for prediction. However, the number of possible 
responses in Selman's study was not as great as for Task A in the 
present study. The higher proportion of "I don't know" responses on 
the picture task would have two effects on the overall results. Since 
this response was given a score of 1, there would be more scores in the 
intermediate range on the picture task than on the story task. The 
higher number of scores in the middle range would reduce the apparent 
discriminability of the task. Since the score of 1 was considered ego­
centric in terms of subject classification, the role-taking ability 
of some children was probably underestimated. This was particularly 
true of the third-graders, because of the large number of "I don't know" 
responses in this age group. 
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In the story task, there were only two logical response alterna­
tives to the Level 3 questions asked. This implicit limitation of 
alternatives probably served to reduce the number of "I don't know" 
responses. The ''I don't know" response was also more likely to indi­
cate true role-taking confusion on this task, since this response was 
not as reasonable for the story task as for the picture task. Consis­
tent with this interpretation, it was the youngest age group that gave 
the largest proportion of "I don't know" responses on Task B. The 
smaller proportion of "I don't know" responses on this task indicates 
that children were more frequently committing themselves to either an 
egocentric or a non-egocentric response. This polarization of responses 
would serve to increase the discriminability of the task. 
As indicated by the above results, the timing of developmental 
changes in role-taking ability varies with the nature and complexity of 
the task used to assess role-taking. The story task used in the present 
study was a simplified version of the story task developed by Flavell et 
al. (1968). Flavell's task consisted of a seven-picture story which the 
child had to retell, from the point of view of another person after 
three pictures had been removed. Flavell et al. (1968) and Selman 
(1971a) found the major improvements on this task to occur between ages 
eight and ten. Kurdek (1975) found some improvement between grades 
two and three, but none between kindergarten and second grade. Layton 
(1975) found low levels of performance in five- and six-year-olds on a 
very similar task, with no improvement between the two ages. Thus, even 
tasks that seem to require very similar role-taking abilities show 
improvements in role-taking performance at different ages. 
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These results lend support to the position of Watson (1975) that 
developmental changes in role-taking performance may be due to in­
creasing complexity of cognitive structures, rather than to a shift 
from egocentrism to sociocentrism. Or, as seems more likely, the 
simplicity of the young child's cognitive structures may severely limit 
his ability to understand the points of view of others. As his cogni­
tive structures become more complex, he may be able to take the role of 
the other in more complex and subtle situations. Perhaps if future 
studies approached role-taking from this position, it would be possib.it; 
to define the important dimensions of task complexity and cognitive 
structure. Such dimensions of existing role-taking tasks have rarely 
been specified. 
Relation of explicitness of task presentation to role-taking. As 
indicated above, emphasizing to the child the "secret" nature of his 
privileged perspective did not have the expected facilitating effect 
on role-taking performance. The variation in task presentation which 
constituted the Explicit condition in the present study was derived 
from the study by Marvin et al. (1975). These authors used a "secret 
game" with preschool children and found the major increase in role-
taking performance to occur between ages three and four years. One 
characteristic of a secret, of course, is that it contains information 
explicitly denied to another person. Thus, use of the term "secret" 
clearly differentiates the privileged perspective from the other 
perspective. 
Reexamination of the Marvin et al. study (1975) and a study by 
Mossier et al. (1976) suggests several possible reasons for the failure 
126 
of the Explicit condition in the present study to elicit higher levels 
of role-taking performance, especially in the younger children. In the 
Marvin et al. study, the difference in perspectives was emphasized by 
one person hiding his eyes. Zn the Mossier et al. study, the different 
tiation was achieved by the "other" (the child's mother) leaving the 
room. However, in both of these studies, the child was only required to 
give a "yes" or "no" response to a direct question about whether cr not 
the "other" possessed the priviledged information. Thus, the success­
ful performance of the preschool children may have been due to the 
direct question response format, rather than to the explicit differen­
tiation of perspectives. This interpretation receives some support 
from the results of the present study, which assessed the effects of 
each of these variables separately. The results showed no effect of 
explicitness of task presentation, but a significant effect of response 
format. However, even the direct question format in the present study 
(Level 1 questions) did not produce the high level of non-egocentric 
responding reported for the preschoolers in the Marvin et al. and 
Mossier et al. studies. 
Another difference between the present study and the studies by 
Marvin et al. and Mossier et al. is that the difference in perspectives 
in the latter studies was signalled by a concrete, visible action 
Chiding eyes, leaving the room). In contrast, in the present study, 
the difference in perspectives was emphasized only verbally, by use of 
the word "secret." In addition, the verbal term ("It is our secret") 
was used in relation to a symbolic "other" in the story task (the 
story character) and to a hypothetical "other" in the picture task (a 
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classmate who was mentioned by name, but who was not physically 
present). Perhaps the concrete, visible actions in the Marvin et al. 
and Mossier et al. studies were more effective in emphasizing the dif­
ference in perspectives than was the more symbolic emphasis used in 
the present study. 
According to Piaget (1928), preschool children tend to center their 
attention on the most salient aspect of a situation. It was pointed out 
in Chapter I that in both the story task and the picture task, the 
privileged information was quite surprising and unexpected. Because 
of this, the privileged information was probably the most salient as­
pect of the task situation. In the present study, the attempt to make 
the difference in perspectives more salient was clearly not effective. 
In contrast, the visible actions used in the Marvin et al. and Mossier 
et al. studies appeared to have been effective in making the differ­
ence in perspectives a salient aspect of the situation. In addition to 
these considerations, it is possible that there are still other features 
of the tasks discussed that make them more or less difficult for 
preschool children. 
Relation of response format to role-taking. Perhaps the most 
interesting finding in the present study is the relation between 
response format and children's role-taking performance. Although other 
studies of role-taking have used tasks that varied in the type of 
response required, there has been little attempt to vary the response 
format systematically (exceptions include Fishbein et al., 1972, and 
Masangkay et al., 1974, using perceptual role-taking tasks). The 
present study used the type of response format originally used with the 
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story task (Ambron, 1973) and the picture task (Chandler et al., 1974). 
This type of response required the child to reconstruct spontaneously 
the perspective of the other C'What will he think?"), requiring hira to 
consider simultaneously his own and the other perspective. Of most 
interest in the present study was the comparison of this type of 
response to a response format that asked the child a direct question 
about whether or not the "other" knew the privileged information. The 
possible effect of this response format was suggested by the Marvin et 
al. (1975) study. However, by comparing the response formats within 
the same task, and by making the same comparison on two different tasks, 
the effect of response format could be assessed, independent of the 
other features of the Marvin et al. task. 
The results indicated that the direct question format markedly 
improved role-taking performance on both tasks. For nursery school 
children on the picture task, the effect was only slight and non-signi­
ficant; and for third-graders on the story task, the effect was slight, 
due to the high level of non-egccentric responding to Level 3 questions. 
However, for each of the other groups on both tasks, at least 30% more 
of the children were classified as Non-Egocentric for Level 1 responses 
than for Level 3 responses. The direct question format was expected 
to have the greatest effect on the performance of the youngest children. 
It is interesting to note, however, that it also had a marked effect on 
the performance of the first-graders on both tasks, and on the per­
formance of the third-graders on the picture task. Thus it appears that 
answering a direct question about what another person knows is easier 
for young children than describing a situation from that other person's 
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point of view. This conclusion is consistent with the writings of 
Piaget and Inhelder (1956), Flavell et al. (1968), and Selman (1971b), 
all of whom state that the simple awareness of different perspectives 
precedes the ability to reconstruct another perspective. 
The Level 2 questions required the child to choose one of two 
response alternatives, an egocentric response or a non-egocentric 
response. This response format was expected to be more difficult than 
the direct question format, because it required simultaneous considera­
tion of two perspectives. It was expected to be easier than the Lev,.! 
3 format, however, because the child did not have to produce spon--
taneously the non-egocentric response. As expected, the Level 2 
questions were more difficult than the Level 1 questions for all age 
groups on both tasks, although the difference was slight for the 
nursery school children on the picture task. Also as expected, the 
Level 2 questions were easier than the Level 3 questions on Task A, 
except for the youngest group. However, for Task B, the Level 2 
questions were more difficult than the Level 3 questions, especially 
for the first- and third-graders. 
The different cognitive requirements of the Level 3 responses on 
the two tasks (discussed in relation to age changes in performance) 
help explain the discrepant results. The Level 3 questions on the 
pi.cture task might produce a considerable amount of uncertainty, due to 
the large number of possible response alternatives. In this case, the 
Level 2 questions would narrow these alternatives to two. In addition, 
they would remind the child of his own naive responses to the droodles. 
This reminder would serve to emphasize to the child the similarity of 
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if Jack had fallen, he probably had blood on his pants, and the mailman 
would figure out that he had fallen. These examples remind us of the 
complexity of children's thought processes and the oversimplification of 
classificatory terms such as "egocentric." These examples also lend 
support to the value of Piaget's interview methods, which attempt to 
probe some of the subtleties of children's thinking. 
Relation of Task A to Task B. Several differences between the two 
tasks have already been pointed out in previous sections of the discus­
sion. These include the different cognitive requirements of the Level 
3 questions, and the different effect of the Level 2 questions for the 
two tasks. Comparison of the tasks in terms of the Cochran Q analysis 
(Table 10) and the average difficulty levels of the items (Table 13), 
indicated no overall difference between the two tasks. The comparisons 
did, however, reflect the specific effects of age and response level 
previously discussed. It is interesting to note that, in contrast to 
the Level 3 and Level 2 responses, the difficulty levels of the Level 1 
responses at every age were almost identical for the two tasks. Thus, 
neither task appears to be consistently more difficult than the other 
for children between four and eight years. However, the cognitive re­
quirements of the two tasks appear to be most similar when Level 1 ques­
tions are asked than when Level 2 or Level 3 questions are asked. 
One assumption of the present study was that both tasks were 
measures of cognitive role-taking ability. Thus, the picture task and 
the story task were assumed to assess performance on the same cognitive 
dimension. If this is true, then performance on the two measures 
should be correlated, especially if there are no systematic differences 
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in difficulty between the two tasks. The results showed that the two 
measures were, in fact, correlated for the total sample. The correla­
tion was considerably higher for the Level 3 scores'(r = .49, < *001) 
than for the Level 2 scores (r = .21, £ < .05), Because of the viola­
tion of parametric assumptions, correlations for Level 1 scores were 
not calculated. Performance on the two tasks, however, was not 
correlated within any of the age groups. These results suggest that 
the two tasks were assessing the same general cognitive ability and 
thus reflected the same major developmental changes. This appeared to 
be especially true of the Level 3 responses. However, the tasks did 
not appear to be similar enough to reflect similar variations in per­
formance within a narrower age range. 
It was also noted that there was greater internal consistency 
among the items on Task A than on Task B. The lower internal consis­
tency on Task B was due largely to one of the stories, which was 
considerably more difficult than the others at all age levels. The 
variation in difficulty levels was generally greater, however, for the 
stories on Task B than for the pictures on Task A. This result 
suggests another difference between the two tasks. The picture task 
presents a rather clear distinction between one perspective (the 
droodle) and the other (the complete picture). Understanding of this 
distinction requires role-taking ability. However, there seems to be 
little chance of a misunderstanding or different interpretation of the 
stimulus materials themselves. In contrast, each of the stories 
presents a sequence of events involving interrelationships among people. 
Thus, a prerequisite to role-taking on this task is accurate comprehen­
sion of the story content. 
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The relatively high internal consistency of the picture task 
suggests that differences in the content of the pictures do not affect 
the difficulty of the items. The lower internal consistency on the 
story task indicates that the different content of the stories does 
affect the difficulty of the items. This result suggests that if 
stories are used to assess role-taking, the content of the stories 
should be carefully examined, so that role-taking per se is not con­
founded with comprehension or interpretation of the story content. It 
is interesting to note, however, that despite the lower internal 
consistency, the story task was more discriminating across ages than 
was the picture task. 
Conclusions 
Several conclusions can be drawn from the present study. First, 
cognitive role-taking performance on the tasks used in this study im­
proves between ages four and eight years. Furthermore, more improvement 
seems to occur between ages four and six years than between six and 
eight years (see Tables 3 and 6). Although this conclusion is not 
surprising, it does indicate that the results of previous studies using 
the same instruments are reproducible (Ambron, 1973; Chandler et al., 
1974). Results of the present study also help clarify the timing of 
developmental changes within the four- to eight-year period. 
A second conclusion is that the type of response required of the 
child significantly affects his role-taking performance in the same task 
situation. Asking a child whether or not another person knows some" 
thing elicits higher levels of accurate role-taking than asking him to 
predict the response of the other on the basis of what the other knows. 
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Although this conclusion has been implied in several studies of per>-
ceptual role-taking, the relation had not been previously tested with 
respect to cognitive role-taking. A third conclusion is that differen­
tiating the cognitive perspectives of the child and the other by 
verbally emphasizing the difference does not seem to be effective. 
If a clear differentiation of perspectives can assist role-taking in 
young children, this differentiation must be achieved in a more effec­
tive way. 
The above generalizations are, of course, limited to populations 
similar to the sample in the present study. The inclusion of a wide 
range of socio-economic levels, of both sexes, and of children from 
public schools in grades one and three, makes the results more widely 
applicable than if a more selective sample had been used. The conclu­
sions might, however, be affected by regional or ethnic differences. 
The conclusions are also limited to the two tasks used to assess role-
taking ability. Comparison of the performance of the same subjects on 
these two tasks suggests that this limitation is an important one. 
Even tasks that appear to require similar role-taking abilities may 
vary in the information processing requirements of the stimulus 
materials and in the cognitive abilities needed to produce a correct 
response. These dimensions of role-staking tasks have not been defined 
clearly enough to permit much generalization across tasks. The conclu­
sions regarding response format are also limited to the specific 
questions asked in the study. The distinction between a direct "does 
he know" question and a question requiring prediction of the response 
of another seems to be an important dimension of response format. 
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The distinction seems to apply to both tasks used in the present study 
and should be investigated further. Finally, the "no-effect" conclu­
sion regarding explicit differentiation of perspectives applies only 
to the variation in task presentation used in the present study. This 
variable might, in fact, be an important one, if it were operationalized 
in a different way. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
It has been suggested that "role-taking" be considered a multi­
dimensional construct, including several types of perspective-taking 
ability (Ambron & Irwin, 1974; Yarrow & Waxier, 1975). On the basis 
of this suggestion, a number of recent studies have made the distinction 
among perceptual, cognitive, and affective role-taking (Ambron & Irwin, 
1974; Kurdek, 1975; Yarrow & Waxier, 1975). The results of the present 
study, in conjunction with other studies, suggest that even the 
narrower dimension of "cognitive role-taking" is a complex phenomenon. 
The increasing ability to understand the cognitive perspective of the 
other seems to be closely related to other aspects of the child's 
cognitive functioning. This is suggested by the fact that the age at 
which children can successfully take the role of the other varies con­
siderably with the type of role-taking performance required. Watson 
(1975) suggests that improvements in role-taking may, in fact, be due 
more to increasing complexity of cognitive structures than to an actual 
shift from an egocentric to a sociocentric orientation. Moir (1974) 
suggests that different aspects of role-taking, such as moral and non-
moral role-taking may be part of a "structure d'ensemble", which is 
"an identifiable whole defined by intrinsic structural connections" 
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(p. 304), Research, however, has hardly begun to explore such struc­
tural connections among various aspects of role-taking and between role-
taking and other cognitive dimensions. 
The results of the present study and the above considerations 
suggest several directions for future research. Although much of the 
previous work in role-taking has been descriptive rather than experi­
mental, we are far from a comprehensive understanding of the develop­
mental course of role-taking. In order to achieve a meaningful 
description of the development of role-taking, it is important to 
examine the cognitive requirements of various role-taking tasks. This 
would include defining the cognitive skills needed to interpret the 
task materials themselves, the type of role-taking ability required to 
understand the other perspective, and the type of response required. 
In attempting to define the important dimensions of role-taking tasks, 
we need to compare the performance of the same children on various 
tasks that have already been developed. In addition, we need to vary 
the cognitive requirements of these same tasks in theoretically meaning­
ful ways. The present study attempted to do this with respect to 
response format and to the explicit differentiation of perspectives. 
Such a plan of research would hopefully provide a description of role-
taking development that is theoretically meaningful rather than merely 
functional (i.e., descriptions of success or failure on isolated tasks). 
It is also important for studies using role-taking tasks to examine 
the reliability and validity of the tasks more carefully. Thus, we need 
studies that are at the same time descriptive, theoretical-experimental, 
and methodological. 
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More studies are also needed which attempt to interrelate the 
various aspects of the multidimensional construct "role^taking Some 
attempt has already been made to relate performance on perceptual, 
cognitive, and affective role-taking tasks (Ambron & Irwin, 1974; 
Kurdek, 1975; Yarrow & Waxier, 1975). In such studies, however, it is 
important to make the cognitive and role-taking requirements of the 
tasks as comparable as possible. For example, in the Ambron and Irwin 
(1974) study, the affective role-taking task was actually an affect 
identification task, involving matching affects to situations and 
situations to affects. Such a task does not seem to require role-taking 
in the sense of a differentiation of one's own affective state from that 
of another. Kurdek (1975) compared the performance of children on 
perceptual, conceptual and affective tasks, and found no significant 
relationships. He concluded, however, that the information-processing 
requirements of the three tasks were quite different. 
Role-taking appears to be related to and to some degree dependent 
upon other cognitive abilities. We therefore need more studies relating 
performance on role-taking tasks and other cognitive tasks. There is 
already evidence for the relation of role-taking and general intelli­
gence (Ambron & Irwin, 1974; Deutsch, 1974). However, role-taking 
might also be related to success on other Piagetian tasks which reflect 
understanding of conservation, classification, or relations. Or perhaps 
it is related to information-processing strategies used by children; or 
to aspects of cognitive style such as reflection-impulsivity. 
Some attempts have been made to relate role-taking to other aspects 
of behavior, such as moral jugement (Ambron & Irwin, 1974; Moir, 1974; 
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Selman, 1971a; Stuart, 1967), prosocial behavior (Rubin & Schneider, 
1973; Yarrow & Waxier, 1975), delinquent behavior (Chandler, 1972), 
and emotional disturbance (Chandler, 1973; Chandler et al., 1974), 
We need more studies such as these, which explore the functional value 
of role-taking for everyday life. If such studies are largely correla­
tional, it will be important to attempt to determine the direction 
of influence of the various variables. 
As indicated by the review of literature, very little research 
has examined antecedent conditions related to individual differences 
in role-taking performance (exceptions are Hollos, 1975; Hollos & Cowan, 
1973; West, 1974). It would be most interesting to look at the relation 
of early socialization experiences and role-taking performance. Is 
role-taking ability of parents or caregivers related to role-taking in 
children? Are different organizations of parent-child relations, or 
different disciplinary patterns related to role-taking? What types 
of early social experiences seem to facilitate role-taking? This area 
is almost totally unexplored. Finally, we need experimental work on 
the modifiability of role-taking skills. Can training programs enhance 
role-taking skill? If so, what types of programs are effective at what 
ages? Does training in role-taking affect other aspects of behavior? 
Some work in this area has already begun with emotionally disturbed 
and delinquent children (Chandler, 1972; 1973; Chandler et al., 1974). 
There is much to be done in the area of role-taking. As we achieve 
a better understanding of the nature and development of role-taking, we 
seem to be finding that this ability influences our interactions with 
others in a great many ways. It thus appears that the study of role-
taking will remain an important area of research for quite some time. 
139 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Ambron, S. R. The relation between role-taking and moral jugement in 
five- and seven-year-olds. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, 
Teachers College, Columbia University, 1973. 
Ambron, S. R., & Irwin, D. M. Role-taking and moral jugement in 5- and 
7-year-olds. Paper presented at the meeting of the National 
Association for the Education of Young Children, Washington, 
November 1974. 
Baldwin, A. J. Theories of child development. New York: John Wiley 
& Sons, 19.67, 
Bearison, D. J. The development of social inference in interpersonal 
communication in children with person and position oriented mothers 
and fathers. Paper presented at the meeting of the Society for 
Research in Child Development, Denver, April 1975. 
Borke, H. Interpersonal perception of young children: Egocentrism or 
empathy? Developmental Psychology, 1971, _5, 263-269. 
Borke, H. Chandler and Greenspan's "Ersatz egocentrism": A rejoinder. 
Developmental Psychology, 1972, 7_, 107-109. 
Borke, H. The development of empathy in Chinese and American children 
between three and six years of age: A cross-cultural study. 
Developmental Psychology, 1973, 9_, 102-109. 
Bruner, J. S., Oliver, R., & Greenfield, M. Studies in cognitive 
growth. New York: Wiley, 1966. 
Burns, N., & Cavey, L. Age differences in empathic ability among 
children. Canadian Journal of Psychology, 1957, 11, 227-230. 
Chandler, M. J, Egocentrism and antisocial behavior: The assessment 
and training of social perspective-taking skills. Developmental 
Psychology, 1973, 9, 326-332. 
Chandler, M. J. Egocentrism in normal and pathological childhood 
development. In F. J. Monks, W. W, Hartup, & J. deWit (Eds,), 
Determinants of behavioral development. New York: Academic 
Press, 1972. 
Chandler, M. J. SRTT (Social Role Taking Task): Scoring Criterion. 
Unpublished manuscript, University of Rochester, undated. 
140 
Chandler, M. J., & Greenspan, S. Ersatz egocentrism: A reply to 
H. Borke. Developmental Psychology. 1972, 7_, 104-106, 
Chandler, M. J., Greenspan, S., & Barenboim, C. Assessment and training 
of role-taking and referential communication skills in institu­
tionalized emotionally disturbed children. Developmental 
Psychology, 1974, _10, 546-553, 
Chandler, M. J., Helm, D., & Smith, M. Developmental changes in the 
contribution of shared experience to social perspective taking 
skills. Paper presented at the regional meeting of the Society 
for Research in Child Development, Chapel Hill, March 1974. 
Cohen, J. Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences. 
New York: Academic Press, 1969. 
Coie, J. D., Costanzo, P. R., & Farnill, D. Specific transitions in the 
development of spatial perspective-taking ability. Developmental 
Psychology, 1973, _9, 167-177. 
Deutsch, F. Female preschoolers' perception of affective responses 
and interpersonal behavior in videotaped episodes. Developmental 
Psychology. 1974, L0, 733-740. 
Deutsch, F. The effects of sex of subject and story character on pre­
schoolers' perceptions of affective responses and intrapersonal 
behavior in story sequences. Developmental Psychology, 1975, 
_U, 112-113, 
Devries, R. The development of role-taking as reflected by behavior 
of bright, average, and retarded children in a social guessing 
game. Child Development, 1970, 41, 759-770. 
Elkind, D. Egocentrism in adolescence. Child Development, 1967, 38, 
1025-1034. 
Feffer, M. H. The cognitive implications of role taking behavior. 
Journal of Personality, 1959, 27, 152-168. 
Feffer, M. H., & Gourevitch, V. Cognitive aspects of role taking in 
children. Journal of Personality, 1960, 28_, 383-396, 
Feshbach, N. Empathy in children: Some theoretical and empirical 
considerations. The Counseling Psychologist, 1975, j>, 25-30, 
Feshbach, N. D., & Roe, K. Empathy in six- and seven-year-olds. 
Child Development, 1968, 39, 133-145. 
Fishbein, H. D., Lewis, S., & Keiffer, K. Children's understanding of 
spatial relations: Coordination of perspectives. Developmental 
Psychology. 1972, _7» 21-33. 
141 
Flapan, D. Childrens's understanding of social interaction. New York: 
Teacher's College Press, 1968. 
Flavell, J. H. The development of inferences about others. In 
T. Mischel (Ed.), Understanding other persons. Oxford: Blackwell, 
Basil, & Mott, 1974. 
Flavell, J. H., Botkin, P. T., Fry, C, L., Wright, J. W., & 
Jarvis, P. E. The development of role-taking and communication 
skills in children. New York: Wiley, 1968. 
Garvey, C., & Hogan, R. Social speech and social interaction: egocen-
trism revisited. Child Development, 1973, 44, 562-568. 
Gates, G. S. An experimental study of the growth of social perception. 
Journal of Educational Psychology, 1923, 14, 449-462. 
Glass, G., Peckham, P., & Sanders, J. Consequences of failure to meet 
assumptions underlying the fixed effects analyses of variance 
and covariance. Review of Educational Research, 1972, 42, 
237-288. 
Glucksberg, S., & Krauss, R. M. What do people say after they have 
learned how to talk?: Studies of the development of referential 
communication. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 1967, 13, 309-316. 
Gollin, E. S. Organizational characteristics of social jugement: A 
developmental investigation. Journal of Personality, 1958, 26, 
139-154. 
Greenspan, S., Barenboim, C., & Chandler, M. J. Empathy and pseudo-
empathy: the affective jugements of first- and third-graders. 
Paper presented at the regional meeting of the Society for Research 
in Child Development, Chapel Hill, March 1974. 
Hollos, M. Logical operations and role-taking abilities in two 
cultures: Norway and Hungary. Child Development, 1975, 46, 
638-649. 
Hollos, M., & Cowan, P. Social isolation and cognitive development; 
logical operations and role-taking abilities in three Norwegian 
social settings. Child Development, 1973, 44, 630-641. 
Inhelder, B., & Piaget, J. The growth of logical thinking from child­
hood to adolescence. New York: Basic Books, 1958. 
Iannotti, R. J. The effect of role-taking experiences on role-taking, 
altruism, empathy, and aggression. Paper presented at the meeting 
of the Society for Research in Child Development, Denver, April 
1975. (a) 
142 
Iannotti, R. J. The many faces of empathy; An analysis of the defini­
tion and evaluation of empathy in children. Paper presented at 
the meeting of the Society for Research in Child Development, 
Denver, April 1975. (b) 
Kerlinger, F. N. Foundations of behavioral research, 2nc* ed. New 
York; Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, Inc., 1973. 
Kingsley, P. Relationship between egocentrism. and children's communi­
cation. Paper presented at the meeting of the Society for 
Research in Child Development, Santa Monica, March 1971. 
Kohlberg, L. Stage and sequence; The cognitive-developmental approach 
to socialization. In D. Goslin (Ed.), Handbook of socialization 
theory and research. Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1969. 
Kuhn, D. The development of role-taking ability. Unpublished manu­
script, Columbia University, 1972. 
Kurdek, L. A. Perceptual, cognitive, and affective perspective-taking 
and empathy in kindergarten through third-grade children. Paper 
presented at the meeting of the Society for Research in Child 
Development, Denver, April 1975. 
Laurendeau, M., & Pinard, A. Development of the concept of space in 
the child. New York: International Universities Press, 1970. 
Layton, T. L. Role-taking, conservation, and language usage of five-
and six-year-old children. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 1975, 
40, 810. 
Lindquist, E. F. Design and analysis of experiments in psychology and 
education. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1953. 
Looft, W. Egocentrism and social interaction across the life span. 
Psychological Bulletin, 1972, 7jJ, 73-92. 
Maccoby, E. E., & Jacklin, C. N. The psychology of sex differences. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974. 
Maratsos, M. P. Nonegocentric communication abilities in preschool 
children. Child Development, 1973, 44, 697-700. 
Marvin, R. S., Mossier, D. G., & Greenberg, M. The development of con­
ceptual perspective-taking in preschool children in a ''secret 
game." Paper presented at the meeting of the Society for Research 
in Child Development, Denver, April 1975. 
Masangkay, Z. S., McCluskey, K. A., Mclntyre, C. W., Sims-Knight, J., 
Vaughn, B. E,,. & Flavell, J. H. The early development of infer­
ences about the visual percepts of others. Child Development, 
1974, 45, 357-366. 
143 
Miller, P. H., Kessel, F. S., & Flavell, J. H. Thinking about people 
thinking about people thinking about . . .; A study of social 
cognitive development. Child Development. 1970, 41_, 613-623. 
Moir, D. J. Egocentrism and the emergence of conventional morality 
in preadolescent girls. Child Development, 1974, 45, 299-304. 
Mossier, D. G . ,  Marvin, R. S., & Greenberg, M. T. Conceptual perspec­
tive taking in 2- to 6-year-old children. Developmental 
Psychology, 1976, 12, 85-86. 
Piaget, J. The language and thought of the child. New York: Harcourt, 
Brace, 1526. 
Piaget, J. Jugement and reasoning in the child. New York: Harcourt, 
Brace, 1928. 
Piaget, J., & Inhelder, B. The child's conception of space. London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956. 
Price, R. Droodles. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1953. 
Rosenthal, R. Interpersonal expectations: Effects of the experi­
menter's hypothesis. In R. Rosenthal & R. L. Rosnow (Eds.), 
Artifact in behavioral research. New York: Academic Press, 1969. 
Rothenberg, B. Children's social sensitivity and the relationship to 
interpersonal competence, intrapersonal comfort, and intellectual 
level. Developmental Psychology, 1970, 2_, 335-350. 
Rubin, K. Egocentrism in childhood: A unitary construct? Child 
Development, 1973, 44, 102-110. 
Rubin, K. H., & Schneider, F. W. The relationship between moral judge­
ment, egocentrism, and altruistic behavior. Child Development, 
1973, 44_, 661-665. 
Selman, R. L. The relation of role-taking ability to the development 
of moral jugement in children. Child Development, 1971, 42, 
79-91. (a) 
Selman, R. L. Taking another's perspective: Role-taking development 
in early childhood. Child Development, 1971, 42, 1721-1734. (b) 
Selman, R. L., & Byrne. D* F, A structural-developmental analysis of 
levels of role-taking in middle childhood. Child Development, 
1974, 45, 803-806. 
Shantz, C. U. Assessment of spatial egocentrism through expectancy 
violation. Psychonomic Science, 1970, 18, 93-94. 
144 
Siegel, S. Nonparametric statistics for the behavioral sciences. 
New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956. 
Stuart, R. B. Decentration in the development of children's concepts 
of moral and causal jugement. Journal of Genetic Psychology, 
1967, Ul_, 59-68. 
Sullivan, E. V., & Hunt, D. E. Interpersonal and objective decentering 
as a function of age and social class. Journal of Genetic 
Psychology. 1967, 110, 199-210. 
Turnure, C. Cognitive development and role-taking ability in boys 
and girls from 7 to 12. Developmental Psychology, 1975, 11, 
202-209. 
Vygotsky, L. S. Thought and language. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1962. 
Watson, M. S. A developmental study of empathy: Egocentrism to 
sociocentrism or simple to complex reasoning? Paper presented at 
the meeting of the Society for Research in Child Development, 
Denver, April 1975. 
West, H. Early peer-group interaction and role-taking skills: An 
investigation of Israeli children. Child Development. 1974, 45. 
1118-1121. 
Winer, B.J. Statistical principles in experimental design. 2n<* ed. 
New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1971. 
Yarrow, M. R., & Waxier, C. Z. The emergence and functions of pro-
social behaviors in young children. Paper presented at the meeting 
of the Society for Research in Child Development, Denver, April 
1975. 
APPENDIX A 
PICTURES FOR THE DROODLES TASK (TASK A) 
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APPENDIX B 
COGNITIVE ROLE-TAKING STORIES (TASK B) 
Story 1 
(a) Marybeth was smelling the beautiful flowers in the park. 
She had picked two flowers when the policewoman on the corner 
saw her and said, "Don't pick the flowers, there won't be any 
for other people to enjoy." 
(b) Then the policewoman walked to a nearby drugstore for a cup 
of coffee, and Marybeth went to the swings to see if her friends 
were there. 
(c) In a few minutes an old woman came to the flowerbed and 
picked all the flowers. She put them into a large basket and 
walked on down the street. 
(d) Marybeth didn't find her friends at the swings so she 
decided to go and look at the flowers again. As Marybeth got 
near the flowerbed she saw that someone had picked all the 
flowers. Just then, the policewoman came back from her coffee 
break and saw the empty flowerbed. Who does the policewoman 
think picked the flowers? 
Story 2 
(a) Jack and Timothy were playing with their airplanes one day 
when they saw the mailman coming down the street. The boys 
ran over to see him, but while Jack was talking to the mailman, 
Timothy took his airplane. 
(b) Soon Jack was chasing Timothy down the street trying to get 
back his plane. The mailman watched them for a minute then 
went down the street to deliver the rest of his mail. Jack ran 
after Timothy shouting, "Give me back my plane or I'll punch 
you!" Timothy just shouted back, "You'll have to catch me first." 
(c) The chase went on and Jack had almost caught Timothy when 
he tripped and fell and skinned his knee. It hurt a lot and he 
started to cry. 
(d) Just then the mailman came around the corner from delivering 
mail to the Jones'. What did the mailman think made Jack cry? 
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Story 3 
(a) Mrs. Rogers was sitting in the living room watching her 
daughters Jill and Tammy, playing. Soon it was time for her 
to go to the kitchen to fix dinner. 
(b) As soon as she left, Jill grabbed Tammy's doll and tried 
to take it away from her, but Tammy wouldn't let go of it, 
(c) Jill said, "I want your doll," and with that she gave 
Tammy a shove. Tammy went sailing right into Mrs. Rogers' 
favorite plant, and the plant and Tammy fell to the floor. 
(d) Mrs. Rogers heard the loud crash and came running to see 
what happened. When she got to the living room she saw Tammy 
all tangled up in the plant on the floor and Jill at the other 
side of the room playing with a doll. Whose fault did 
Mrs. Rogers think it was that the plant got knocked over? 
Story 4 
(a) Donald was fingerpainting at the kitchen table. On his way 
outside, Donald's father said, "Be careful with the fingerpaint 
and don't take it out of the kitchen." 
(b) While Donald was washing his hands at the kitchen sink, his 
dog Laddie jumped on the table and got some of the fingerpaint 
on his tail. 
(c) Laddie went into the living room and brushed his tail up 
against the door getting bright red paint on it. Then Laddie 
went down into the basement to chew on his bone. 
(d) Donald's father soon came back inside and saw the paint on 
the living room door. Who did Donald's father think got the 
fingerpaint on the living room door? 
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APPENDIX C 
PROCEDURES FOR ADMINISTRATION OF TASKS 
Procedures for Task A 
Non-Explicit Condition. When the child and the 12 were seated at 
the table, the IS said: "I'm going to show you some pictures" (or "Now 
I'm going to show you some different pictures without stories^l' if 
Task B had been given first). "Look at this first picture and tell me 
what you think it is, or might be," The child's response was recorded 
in the space provided for the "Naive Response" on the response form. 
The E_ then said: "Now I'm going to show you what's underneath the 
frame. Now what do you think it is? When the child had responded, 
the J2 repeated his response, saying, "Yes, it does look like a . . ." 
12 then replaced the frame and said, "Now, let's put the frame back on. 
Your classmate (John) is going to come in next and look at this 
picture just the way it is now. What do you think he will day it is?" 
The child's response was recorded in the space provided for the Level 3 
response on the response form. The IS then asked, "Why do you think he 
will say that?" 12 then asked, "Will he think it is a (egocentric 
response based on the child's description of the complete picture) or a 
(non-egocentric response, based on the child's naive response to the 
droodle)?" The order of presentation of these alternatives was indi­
cated on the response form. The child's response was recorded under 
the heading "Level 2" on the response form. 12 then asked, "Will (John) 
know that there are (description of picture) under the frame?" The 
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response was recorded under the heading "Level 1" on the response form. 
The same procedure was carried out for each of the five pictures. 
Explicit Condition. The task was introduced in the same manner as 
for the Non-Explicit condition. However, after the child had given his 
naive response to the abbreviated droodle, the IS said: "Now I'm going 
to show you a secret. I'm going to show you what's underneath the 
frame." The 15 emphasized the unveiling, and said; "Now what do you 
think it is?" The procedure continued as above, until IS said; "Now 
let's put the frame back on." 12 then said: "You and I know what's 
under the frame, don't we? It's our secret." The procedure then 
continued as above. 
Task B 
Non-Explicit Condition. The IS said: "To begin with (or "Now"), 
I'm going to show you some pictures that tell a story". IS placed the 
four pictures of the first story from left to right in front of the 
child. IS then read the narrative that went with the first picture, as 
she pointed to that picture. IS continued with each succeding picture, 
ending with the question that required the child to interpret the 
final scene from the story character's point of view (see Appendix B). 
The child's response was recorded in the space provided for the Level 3 
response on the response form for Task B. IS then asked: "Why do you 
think he will think that?" JS then asked: "Will he think (egocentric 
response based on privileged information) or will he think (non-egocen­
tric response, based on logical alternative)?" Again, the order of 
presentation of these alternatives was indicated on the response form. 
After this response had been recorded under the heading "Level 2", E, 
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said: "Will (the character) know (the privileged information)?" The 
response was recorded on the response form under the heading "Level 1". 
The same procedure was carried out for each of the four stories. 
Explicit Condition. The task was introduced in the same manner as 
for the Non-Explicit condition. However, after the narrative that went 
with the first picture had been given, the IS said: "Now I'm going to 
show you a secret that (the story character) doesn't know. Look what 
happened while he was gone.'1 The procedure continued as above through 
picture three. After the third picture, the E_ said: "You and I know 
(repeat privileged information), don't we? It's our secret." The 
procedure was then completed as above. 
After both tasks had been completed, the E_ thanked the child for 
his help. The _E also asked the child not to discuss the tasks with his 
classmates, until they had all had a turn. Before returning to the 
classroom with the child, the 12 arranged the task materials in the 
proper order for the next child. 
APPENDIX D 
SAMPLE RESPONSE FORKS 
Cognitive 
Name; 
Sex: 
Birthdate; 
Experimental Condition: 
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I.D. # 
Role-Taking Study 
School: 
Teacher: 
Date of Testing: 
Time of Testing: 
Picture (3) 
Naive Response 
Level 3: 
Level 2 (E-NE) 
Level 1: 
Picture (2) 
Naive Response 
Level 3: 
Level 2 (NE-E) 
Level 1: 
Picture (5) 
Naive Response 
Level 3; 
Level 2 (NE-E) 
Level 1: 
Picture (1) 
Naive Response 
Level 3: 
Level 2 (E-NE): 
Level 1: 
Picture (4) 
Naive Response: 
Level 3: 
Level 2 (E-NE): 
Level 1: 
story (2) 
Level 3: 
Level 2 (NE-E) 
Level 1: 
Story (4) 
Level 3: 
Level 2 (E-NE) 
Level 1: 
Story (3) 
Level 3: 
Level 2 (E-NE) 
Level 1: 
Story (1) 
Level 3: 
Level 2 (NE-E) 
Level 1: 
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APPENDIX E 
SCORING PROCEDURES 
Task A (Droodles) 
2 points: "Responses scored as two indicate that a clear distinc­
tion has been drawn between the subject's own interpretation of the 
complete drawing and the interpretation assigned to an onlooker who 
views only a fractional part of the complete design. Responses in this 
category include no direct or indirect contaminations or infusions of 
any privileged denotative or connotative meaning into the attributions 
provided. Responses of this sort often, but do not necessarily, include 
editorial remarks in which the subject comments in a reflective fashion 
on the differences between his own and the target character's inter­
pretation of the stimulus materials" (Chandler, undated, p. 6). 
1 point: "Responses scored as one are free of any gross or 
flagrant egocentric intrusions and evidence a cautious effort on the 
part of the subject to avoid any frank attribution of privileged infor­
mation to only partially informed onlookers. At the same time, how­
ever, the attributions which are made include reference to processes 
or content details which contain connotative meanings which overlap 
with implications inherent in and unique to the content of the complete 
drawings. Examples of contaminated responses scored in this category 
include statements describing portion of the camel's hump in drawing 
#3 as piles of sand in the desert, or the ship's prow and witch's hat 
of drawing #4 as two sailboats or two shark's fins. Examples of 
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contaminations which imply similarities in function rather than content 
include statements that design #5 depicts some object other than a bear 
climbing some object other than a tree, or describes the elephant trunks 
of design #2 as objects which are in the process of being fired, shot, 
blown etc." (Chandler, undated, p. 6). Also included in this category 
are "attributions which ascribe to target characters an interpretation 
of the available stimulus details which obviously draw from a knowledge 
of the completed drawing, yet carefully avoid any direct reference to 
totally hidden detail. Such responses comment specifically on the 
visible, fractional parts of the larger drawing and assign meaning to 
them which would be unreasonable without specific knowledge of the com­
plete drawings. Examples of responses scored in this category include 
descriptions of the triangles in figure #4 as a witch's hat, che semi­
circles in drawing #5 as bear's feet, or the looped line in drawing #1 
as a trombone" (Chandler, undated, p. 7). The principle distinction 
between responses scored in this category and those scored in the 
egocentric response category is that "the subject studiously avoids 
reference to details completely unavailable to the onlooker, i.e., 
reference is made to bears' feet, but not to bears, horns but not horn 
players, or witches' hats without the witch" (Chandler, undated, p. 7). 
Also included in this scoring category are "I don't know" responses. 
0 points: "Responses scored as zero involve flatly egocentric 
attributions which include direct reference to both partially visible 
and entirely invisible details and assign interpretations of these 
materials to target characters which are privileged and wholely 
unavailable to others" (Chandler, undated, p. 7). Responses will be 
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scored zero even if "the attributions are qualified and laced with 
conditional or probabilistic terminology" (Chandler, undated, p. 7). 
Task B (Stories) 
2 points: Responses scored as two indicate that a clear distinc­
tion has been made between the subject's own interpretation of the final 
scene (based on the complete story) and the interpretation assigned to 
the character in the story, who has seen only part of the events which 
have taken place. Responses in this category include no direct or 
indirect contamination or infusions of any privileged information into 
the attributions provided. Responses of this sort often, but do not 
necessarily, include editorial remarks in which the subject comments in 
a reflective fashion on the differences between his own and the target 
character's interpretation of the final scene of the story. 
1 point: Responses scored as 1 are free of any gross or flagrant 
egocentric intrusions and evidence a-cautious effort on the part of the 
subject to avoid any frank attribution of privileged informatiDTr to the 
character in the story. At the same time, however, the attributions 
which are made have connotative meanings which overlap with implications 
inherent in and unique to the content of the complete story. An example 
of such a response would be to say that the father (in story 4) would 
think "A cat came in and did it" or "A monster did it." Also included 
in this category are responses which refer to both egocentric and non-
egocentric alternatives — e.g., "He might think the boy and the dog did 
it" or "He might think the dog did it, or he might think the boy did it." 
Also included in this scoring category are "I don't know" responses. 
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0 points: Responses scored as zero involve flatly egocentric 
attributions which are based directly on the privileged information 
in the story. Such responses are scored zero, even if they are phrased 
is conditional or probabilistic terms, such as, "Maybe he would think 
the dog did it." 
